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This study is concerned with ways that clinical psychologists construct the clinical 
psychologist’s experience of distress, in relation to their professional identity, and 
the implications these constructions have for their social practices in relation to 
personal distress. Nine qualified clinical psychologists in practice in the NHS 
were interviewed using a semi-structured interview approach. Data from these 
interviews was analysed using a discourse-informed approach to Thematic 
Analysis. Three overarching themes were formed: psychologist’s distress is 
constructed as part of the human condition, work with distress as a difficult and 
skilled practice, negotiating dilemmas of professional identity and role. These 
themes are discussed with reference to the socio-cultural and historical context of 
the profession of Clinical Psychology. In dialogue with literature and research 
pertaining to clinical psychologist’s distress and help-seeking, and broader 
aspects of the institutional and professional context. Findings supported the view 
that the ways contemporary clinical psychologists in the NHS are positioned by 
language, social practices, and institutions can function to constrain clinical 
psychologists from talking about personal distress and accessing support. 
However, findings also indicated that there is scope in the contemporary clinical 
psychologist professional identity for resistance to discourses and practices that 
limit space for clinical psychologists to acknowledge their own vulnerability. 
Implications for Clinical Psychology practice and further research are considered. 
In conclusion, it is suggested that the acknowledgement of a human vulnerability 
by clinical psychologists can create the conditions for individual and collective 
action to respond to distress experienced by clinical psychologists, and their 
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1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1. Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with ways in which clinical psychologists construct the 
clinical psychologist’s experience of distress, in relation to their professional 
identity, and the implications these constructions have for their ways of being in 
relation to personal distress. Distress has been described as central to the work 
of the clinical psychologist by the British Psychological Society’s (BPS) Division 
of Clinical Psychology (DCP). A DCP document entitled The Core Purpose and 
Philosophy of the Profession states: “Clinical Psychology aims to reduce 
psychological distress and to enhance and promote psychological wellbeing by 
the systematic application of knowledge derived from psychological theory and 
data” (Toogood, 2010, p.2). The original short document of the same name 
defined the purpose of the profession in the same way, and in terms of the 
functions: assessment, formulation, intervention, evaluation, and research (DCP, 
2001). Thus, the work of the clinical psychologist has been defined, by the DCP, 
as having the intention to reduce distress and promote wellbeing through the 
carrying out of these functions within the health service. In the 2010 document, 
the listed functions of the clinical psychologist was expanded to include: 
transferable skills, personal and professional skills, communication and teaching 
skills, and service delivery skills (Toogood, 2010). The expansion of the functions 
of the clinical psychologist, over the ten years between documents, reflects a 
developmental change in the way the profession has come to define the means 
of achieving its stated purpose over time, with an increasing emphasis on 
functions that indicate an expectation that clinical psychologists will work within 
teams, and on skills denoting suitability for leadership positions within the health 
service.  
The question that this thesis seeks to address is the scope that the professional 
identity of clinical psychologist allows for clinical psychologists to think about, and 
act in relation to, personal distress. Firstly, some of the dominant ways of 
conceptualising distress in the broader social context will be reviewed. This is 
followed by an exploration of the clinical psychologist’s professional identity in 






consideration of personal distress experienced by the clinical psychologist. 
Subsequently, the ways in which clinical psychologist’s distress has been spoken 
about in literature, the public domain, and research will be considered. Lastly, 
existing research in the area will be reviewed, and perceived gaps in the 
evidence-base that prompted this study elaborated. 
1.2. What is Distress?  
Distress is a nebulous term, chosen for this research for its polysemic nature. In 
everyday talk, it can be used to refer to a broad range of human experiences of 
physical or emotional suffering. Synonyms for distress in the Oxford English 
Dictionary include: “anguish, suffering, pain, agony, ache, affliction, torment, 
torture, discomfort, heartache, heartbreak” (“Distress”, 2019). In a mental health 
context, the term distress usually refers to experiences that might otherwise be 
called mental illness or psychopathology (Cromby, Harper & Reavey, 2013).  
In the field of science, distress is thought about using models. As a body of 
knowledge and a clinical practice, the models of distress drawn on by Clinical 
Psychology are many and varied. These models construct distress in various 
ways, perhaps privileging different aspects of the experience of distress. Clinical 
psychologists learn about these models in their professional training and in 
interaction with other professionals in professional life. Constraints of space 
preclude consideration of all models of distress. As such, key overarching models 
will be considered in brief. It should be noted that, in contemporary clinical 
practice, clinical psychologists may draw on a number of models simultaneously 
and consider interactions (e.g., the Biopsychosocial model). 
1.2.1. Somatogenic Model 
The somatogenic model is perhaps the oldest model of distress. This model 
posits that distress is caused by the body. Ancient Greeks hypothesised various 
bodily causes of distress, for example, an imbalance of humors in the body 
(Simon, 1978). The modern-day medical model is an example of a somatogenic 
model. Distress is commonly conceptualised as psychopathology within a 
medical model framework and categorised into various psychiatric disorders 






caused by the imbalance of chemicals in the brain, the main treatments 
prescribed by this model are calculated to effect change in physiology, such as 
psychotropic medications prescribed to affect brain chemistry.  
1.2.2. Psychogenic Model  
According to the psychogenic model, distress arises out of the mind. The events 
that happen in the world are considered by this model, but the individual’s 
interpretation of experience is privileged in hypothesising causes of distress.  
Psychoanalysis is perhaps the oldest example of a psychogenic model, 
conceptualising distress as arising out of an unconscious conflict in the mind of 
the individual and the mind’s attempts to manage this conflict through the 
operation of unconscious psychic defence mechanisms (Milton, Polmear & 
Fabricius, 2011). In a broad sense, a treatment based on a model informed by 
psychoanalytic theory entails the therapist helping the patient to become 
conscious of, and work through, the psychic conflicts that are hypothesised to be 
causing their distress (Milton et al., 2011). Transference and countertransference 
are key concepts in psychoanalytic theory. Transference is a hypothesised 
unconscious process through which the client’s relationship with a significant 
attachment figure is transposed onto the relationship with the therapist (in the 
client’s mind), countertransference is the hypothesised unconscious response of 
the therapist to the client (Lemma, 2003). 
Cognitive Therapy is also an example of a psychogenic model, but one with a 
conceptualisation of distress very different from that of Psychoanalysis. While the 
existence of the unconscious is the central premise of Psychoanalysis, Cognitive 
Therapy does not theorise unconscious processes. Cognitive Therapy is heavily 
influenced by Stoic philosophy and the key technique, the rational weighing up of 
evidence for thoughts or beliefs, is modelled on the reputed practice of the Stoic 
philosopher Socrates (Robertson, 2010). An individual’s distress is hypothesised 
to be caused by the way they are interpreting their experience (rather than the 
experience itself, as such), and that it can, thus, be managed by the rational 
weighing up of evidence by the individual to change their view of experience 






1.2.3. Sociogenic Model  
In this model, distress is viewed as caused by environmental and social 
influences, including an individual’s social location (e.g., abuse, poverty and 
oppression), adverse life events, and interactions with other people.  
Behaviourism could be considered the first sociogenic model, as distress is 
conceptualised as the outcome of behavioural learning (Cromby et al., 2013). 
Classic behavioural approaches restricted their theorising and intervention to that 
which could be directly observed; thus, the mind was not theorised. The focus in 
behavioural treatment is on observing and changing client behaviour to facilitate 
new learning and, thereby, reduce distress and improve functioning (Wolpe & 
Lazarus, 1966). 
Systemic Family Therapy is another example of a sociogenic model of distress. 
Distress is conceptualised as the product of a system, a symptom of relationships 
and communication between members of the system (Dallos & Draper, 2010). 
Intervention is usually at the level of the system (i.e. the family) as, according to 
this model, systemic change is required to change an individual’s experience of 
distress (Dallos & Draper, 2010). 
1.3. Professional Identity 
1.3.1. The Birth of a Profession 
Clinical Psychology in Britain is a relatively young profession with a history that 
spans some 80 years. The history of British Clinical Psychology is the history of 
an academic discipline that evolved in a cultural and philosophical context 
dominated by empiricism and pragmatism, subsequently moving into an applied 
setting (Hall, Pilgrim & Turpin, 2015). Throughout the 20th Century, Clinical 
Psychology in Britain was a white middle-class male-dominated profession, with 
white men occupying the majority of leadership roles (Pilgrim & Patel, 2015). 
Clinical psychologists have offered a critique of the (white, western) patriarchal 
forms of leadership and knowledge that dominated the profession’s beginnings 
(Nicolson & Ussher, 1992). It has been posited that dichotomies between mind 
and nature, reason and feeling, masculine and feminine, were embedded in the 






psychology (Keller, 1985). In the 21st century, the majority of the Clinical 
Psychology workforce are white middle-class women (Patel, 2015), but women 
continue to be underrepresented in senior Clinical Psychology roles (Islam & 
Schlosser, 2016). Black and minority ethnic groups are also hugely 
underrepresented in the profession (Pilgrim & Patel, 2015). At the time of the 
profession’s beginnings and throughout its early years of development, the 
dominant British cultural script regarding personhood prised fortitude, stoicism, 
and restraint, with the metaphor of the stiff upper lip and the emblem of the British 
bulldog exemplifying cultural constructions of resilience (Furedi, 2002).  
1.3.2. What is Professional Identity? 
Social action was once viewed as governed by identity, with individual identity 
conceptualised as an essential, socialised, internal psychic phenomenon 
(Benwell & Stokoe, 2006). A Postmodern turn in the social sciences, while not 
disputing a relationship between social action and identity, has radically re-
conceptualised identity as a public phenomenon, a construction or performance 
that takes place in discourse, social action, and embodied conduct (Benwell & 
Stokoe, 2006). Davidson and Patel (2009) suggest that the professional identity 
of the clinical psychologist can be understood as shaped by the way clinical 
psychologists are described and positioned in language, by social practices, and 
social institutions.  
The identity of the clinical psychologist will be explored further with a 
consideration of Clinical Psychology roles and the constructions of professional 
identity these roles imply, with particular reference to the space these 
constructions allow for consideration of the emotional experience of the 
psychologist.  
1.4. Clinical Psychology Roles and the Personhood of the Psychologist 
The history of the profession is intertwined with the history of the National Health 
Service (NHS) of the United Kingdom, as the birth and development of the 
profession is coterminous with the birth and development of this institution. The 
NHS has both nurtured and shaped the profession over the years, offering unique 






the funder of Clinical Psychology training programmes (Richardson, 2015). As 
the profession has developed over the years since its inception, clinical 
psychologists have occupied various roles within the NHS. Rather than these 
roles sequentially replacing each other, the profession has broadened over time, 
incorporating all of these roles.  
1.4.1. Psychometric Tester 
Clinical psychologists initially specialised in assessment and diagnosis using 
psychometric tests. Eysenck initially believed that clinical psychologists, as 
applied scientists, should stick to assessment and diagnosis using scientific tests 
and not be involved in the provision of therapy (Eysenck, 1952). A number of 
tests were developed by clinical psychologists, including tests of intelligence 
(Weshler, 1949) and of personality (Eysenck, 1964). Clinical psychologists are 
involved in testing to this day, particularly in older adult services, child and 
adolescent mental health teams, and services for people with a learning disability 
(Hubbard & Hare, 2015). Psychologists apply these tests to compare the 
performance of an individual client to population norms or, in the case of 
personality tests, to diagnose the structure of what is conceptualised as an 
internal, stable, context-independent character of an individual: the personality. 
The point has been made that psychometric tests legitimise binaries, dichotomies 
between the normal and the abnormal, the mad and the sane (Hubbard & Hare, 
2015). The tester is constructed as the classic (male) scientist, rational and 
objective in their application of a scientific test. It follows that the personhood or 
emotional experience of the psychologist has not been considered relevant in this 
role. 
1.4.2. Scientist Practitioner 
Schon (1983) suggests that, in establishing a respectable standing within a 
society, most professions lay claim to a knowledge base supported by positivist 
science. Clinical Psychology, building on their established niche in psychometric 
testing, continued along the path established by this role and defined themselves 
as scientist-practitioners with unique credentials in the application of 
psychological science to human problems (Pilgrim & Treacher, 1992). This model 






increasing autonomy and expansion of the profession (e.g. The Trethowan 
Report, 1977). A survey of qualified and trainee clinical psychologists in the UK, 
in 2001, concluded that the majority of those surveyed continued to endorse the 
scientist-practitioner model (Kennedy & Llewelyn, 2001).  
As a model of professional practice for psychologists, the scientist-practitioner 
model has been the subject of criticism as well as strong endorsement (Lane & 
Corrie, 2006). It has been posited that the attention to the personal necessary to 
support the development of self-knowledge and a capacity to manage emotional 
experience, qualities considered central to the capacity to care by 
psychotherapists (Gilbert, Hughes & Dryden, 1987), are constrained for the 
clinical psychologist by the scientist-practitioner model. Pilgrim and Treacher 
(1992) proposed that the scientist-practitioner model constructed the psychologist 
as an “omniscient scientist who is not himself (male pronoun used advisedly 
DP/AT) a possible object (or subject) for scientific investigation” (p.130). They 
declared, at this time, that there was a crisis in the profession of Clinical 
Psychology as trainees were being inducted into a profession which had a 
“macho tradition of the scientist-practitioner [which] precludes any real discussion 
of vulnerability” (p.139). Mollon (1989) posited that scientism was utilised as a 
psychic defence by the profession to defend against the emotional impact of 
working with people in pain, resulting in a fraudulent identity for the clinical 
psychologist, an identity based on a fantasy of omnipotence in which personal 
distress is denied. He suggested that an alternative way for the clinical 
psychologist to build professional identity is a slower process of learning, 
developing skill and understanding through the acknowledgement and struggle 
with emotional pain, but that this process requires space for the psychologist to 
acknowledge emotional responses and feelings of inadequacy (Mollon, 1989).  
1.4.3. Psychological Therapist 
However, clinical psychologists are not, strictly speaking, psychotherapists. Parry 
(2015) differentiates the two professions by the range of theories clinical 
psychologists, as the “ultimate pragmatists” (p.184), tend to draw on in research 






In the early days of the profession, there was a tension between psychologists 
who championed Behaviourism, such as those working at the Maudsley Hospital, 
and those who were influenced by Psychoanalysis, many of whom were based at 
the Tavistock Clinic (Pilgrim & Patel, 2015). Hans Eysenck at the Maudsley 
Hospital initially reviled psychotherapy, considering it unscientific and ineffective 
(Eysenck, 1952). In 1958, he was to endorse Behavioural therapy, a therapy that 
he believed had an empirical rather than a theoretical basis (Eysenck & Gwynne-
Jones, 1958). By the 1960s, therapies based on behavioural science became 
widely disseminated by clinical psychologists, carving out an expert role for 
clinical psychologists in therapeutic practice in the NHS (Parry, 2015). However, 
despite strong opposition from within the profession, and it's being somewhat 
inimical to the British philosophical and cultural context at the time, 
psychoanalytic theory and practice was to retain a foothold in Clinical Psychology 
as a model of psychotherapeutic practice (e.g., Lemma, 2015), and a framework 
for critique of the mainstream tradition in psychology (e.g., Henriques, Hollway, 
Urwin, et al., 1998). From the 1980s onwards, the range of therapeutic models 
available to the profession grew exponentially, coming to include humanist and 
experiential therapeutic approaches, such as Carl Rogers’s Person-Centred 
Therapy (Rogers, 1961), a therapy based on constructivism: Personal Construct 
Therapy (PCT: Butt, 2008) and, therapies unpinned by a social constructionist 
epistemology: Narrative Therapies (e.g., White, 1989).  
Despite the broad range of psychotherapeutic approaches available, a hybrid of 
Behavioural Therapy and Cognitive Therapy, Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
(CBT), was to emerge as the dominant form of psychotherapy available through 
the NHS in the 21st Century (Marks, 2015). Current BPS standards for Clinical 
Psychology course accreditation state that clinical psychologists should have the 
“ability to implement therapeutic interventions based on knowledge and practice 
in at least two evidence-based models of formal psychological interventions, of 
which one must be Cognitive Behavioural Therapy” (BPS, 2019, p.17). In the 21st 
century, so called ‘Third-wave’ cognitive behavioural therapies were developed, 
including Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT: Hayes, 2004), 
Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT: Segal & Teasdale, 2018), and 






on evolutionary theory to normalise experiences of distress and are more 
process-focused, promoting mindfulness and acceptance of emotional 
experience, with key techniques based on Buddhist meditation practices (Hayes, 
2004). 
Due to constraints of space, this review will content itself with a brief exploration 
of the CBT approaches and two of the other (arguably most influential) 
therapeutic orientations, with particular reference to the constructions of the 
therapist, and therapist emotional experience, allowed by these frameworks.  
Behavioural and Cognitive approaches 
The classic behavioural therapist is constructed as the (male) scientist, objective 
and rational in the application of techniques such as reinforcement schedules and 
exposure. Classic Behaviourism does not consider the person of the therapist 
beyond thinking about their application of technique and the behaviour they are 
modelling for the client (Wolpe & Lazarus, 1966). The cognitive therapist is also 
constructed as a scientist, an expert, who, ideally in collaboration with the client, 
formulates an understanding of the maintenance of the client’s distress by (what 
are judged to be) dysfunctional client thoughts and behaviours, designing 
behavioural experiments to test these thoughts and behaviours, and alternatives 
(Greenberger & Padesky, 1995). Historically, the person of the therapist and their 
emotional experience was not accorded much attention in CBT theorising. Where 
therapist emotional responses have been considered, they have been considered 
with a view to therapist self-management of these responses (Sudak, Codd, 
Ludgate et al., 2016). Judith Beck (2011) recommends that the therapist engage 
in self-scanning when working with clients with more complex difficulties. The aim 
of this scanning is for the therapist to detect changes in their own thinking, 
emotions, behaviour, or physiology that are evoked by interactions with the client 
(an application of the CBT model to therapist experience) so that they can self-
manage these responses, through the application of the CBT technique to 
themselves (Beck, 2011). James Bennett-Levy (2003) calls this self-management 
practice self-practice/self-reflection (SPSR), and it has been suggested that the 
practice of SPSR can substitute for personal therapy for the therapist 






The Third-wave CBT approaches share some similarities with the parent 
frameworks, but with some notable differences. As with classic Behavioural 
Therapy, the therapist is constructed by ACT discourse as a teacher and a model 
of behaviour for the client (Luoma, Hayes & Walser, 2007). However, practices of 
self-disclosure1 by therapists are allowed, should these practices be considered 
helpful to the client (Luoma et al., 2007). A similar construction of the therapist as 
‘model’ for the client is produced by CFT discourse. Kolts and Hayes (2016) 
advise that the CFT therapist should “serve as a living embodiment and model of 
this compassionate self” (p.42), to be perceived by clients “both as competent 
helpers and as real human beings who have sometimes struggled with some of 
the very things that trouble them” (p.42).  
Overall, self-reliance is promoted within a CBT framework. Both for the client, 
who after a short period of therapy should be skilled in applying the CBT 
techniques to themselves, no longer needing the therapist, and for the therapist, 
who is expected to be skilled in self-management of their own emotional 
experience.  
Psychoanalytically-informed approaches 
At the other end of the spectrum are the therapies that draw on psychoanalytic 
theory. Within a psychoanalytic tradition, the therapist is expected to have their 
own ‘neurosis’: an unconscious constellation of unconscious conflicts and 
defences, causative of distress and problems in living, to be explored in intensive 
personal therapy (Milton, Polmear & Fabricius, 2011). Freud originally considered 
countertransference, conceptualised as: “a result of the patient’s influence on [the 
analysts] unconscious feelings” (1910/1964a, p.144), as an impediment to 
therapy to be overcome by the analyst who should function as a mirror of client 
experience (Freud, 1912/1964b). However, the concept has undergone a series 
of radical revisions since Freud’s time, and contemporary psychoanalytic 
theorists agree that counter-transference phenomena are an inevitable 
concomitant of therapy and, furthermore, are of crucial importance, as an 
                                                             
1 Therapist self-disclosure is a term that has been used within the literature to refer to the 
therapist telling the client that they have personal experience of distress (with distress often 
framed as mental health problems), and, more broadly, to refer to the therapist sharing any 






invaluable source of information about the client’s internal world (Sandler, Dare, 
Holder et al., 1992). However, while the conceptualisation of therapist emotional 
responses in psychoanalytic theory changed, the echoes of Freud’s (1912/1964b) 
mirror construction of the therapist have persisted in the recommendation that the 
therapist not display their emotional reactions to the client, as this could interfere 
with the development of the client’s transference (Sandler et al., 1992). A 
common construction of the therapist in psychoanalytic discourse is therapist as 
maternal figure, involved in a process of holding and maternal reverie in their 
work with the client, who is required to have a healthy dependence on them as 
the source of containment (Sandler et al., 1992). Containment is conceptualised 
as a process that entails the therapist tolerating the client’s emotional experience 
without retaliation, and offering explanations of their distress (called 
interpretations) from an expert position (Sandler et al., 1992). Contemporary 
relational psychoanalysts depart somewhat from this view as, in addition to 
considering transference and countertransference dynamics crucial, they stress 
the importance of the dynamics of a co-constructed intersubjective relationship 
between analyst and client to the therapy process (Benjamin, 2004), and “value a 
greater mutuality and humanness in the treatment relationship” (Bridges, 1999, 
p.293). 
Systemic approaches  
Therapists of the Milan school, the earliest tradition of systemic psychotherapists, 
were psychoanalysts who departed from this tradition, rejecting a focus on the 
de-contextualised individual, and their intrapsychic world, in favour of a view of 
the individual in a relational context within the world (Cromby et al., 2013). 
Therapists were urged to aspire for neutrality initially, by treating all interpretative 
positions as equally valid and resisting a pull to align with any individual 
perspective (Cecchin, 1987). The concept of neutrality was subject to critique and 
evolved into the ideal of a therapist who maintains a stance of curiosity, holding 
all perspectives, all views of reality, lightly (including their own) and being open 
to, and curious about, alternative perspectives (Cecchin, 1987). In contemporary 
theory and practice, self-reflexivity (Burnham, 1993), a process in which the 
therapist considers how their socially constructed personhood informs therapeutic 






for reflection, including a reflection on the personhood of the therapist and the 
emotion evoked by the work, particularly in work with clients with a history of 
trauma (Smith, 2012).  
1.4.4. Reflective-Scientist Practitioner 
It has been suggested that the roots of the professional identity in the British 
philosophical traditions of empiricism and pragmatism disabled reflection on 
practice for clinical psychologists in the early days of the profession (Pilgrim & 
Treacher, 1992). However, over the years, as Behavioural Therapy became 
Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy, integrating a greater focus on cognition, the 
behaviourist wholesale rejection of an inner life became less tenable. In recent 
years, theory imported from a teaching and education setting: reflective practice 
(Schön, 1983), has been embraced by the profession. The reflective-practitioner 
model has joined the scientist-practitioner model in underpinning the construction 
of the clinical psychologist identity in BPS standards for Clinical Psychology 
course accreditation, which states that trainees should be trained to develop 
“clinical and research skills that demonstrate work with clients and systems 
based on a scientist-practitioner and reflective-practitioner model” (BPS, 2019, 
p.8). In the 21st century, the declaration was made that Clinical Psychology was 
in the middle of a paradigm shift toward a reflective-practitioner model (Stedmon, 
Mitchell, Johnstone et al., 2003).  
As with many other concepts and practices in Clinical Psychology, and reflecting 
the pluralism of the profession in approaches to therapy, reflective practice is a 
concept that has been interpreted in various ways by clinical psychologists. Some 
interpretations draw on psychoanalytic theory in talking about: “attending to the 
patient within us” in understanding process issues in therapy (O’Loughlin, 2003, 
p.24). Some appear to consider systemic factors in talk about the need for the 
system to offer “emotional and cognitive space” for the psychologist, to facilitate 
reflection (Paula, 2003, p.28). Within the majority of these constructions, attention 
to the relationship between the work and the self of the psychologist is validated 







The review and introduction of new pay and conditions for service for (almost all) 
NHS staff as set out in Agenda for Change (Department of Health, 2003) worked 
in favour of the profession. Clinical psychologists were given high bandings 
relative to other professional groups, further increasing the power of the 
profession within the health service. However, it has been suggested that this 
also put increasing pressure on the profession to prove its worth, relative to 
colleagues in the health service on a lower banding (Hall, Pilgrim & Turpin, 2015). 
In 2007, the DCP produced the guidance Leading Psychological Services to 
encourage clinical psychologists at all levels to take up leadership roles in the 
NHS. The Clinical Leadership Competency Framework produced by the NHS 
lists self-awareness and self-management as key personal qualities required of 
the NHS leader (NHS & Academy of Medical Royal Colleges, 2010). The BPS 
emphasises relationality in the observation that: “Contemporary leadership styles 
are generally more aligned to working within a team or a system rather than 
being directive” (BPS, 2017, p.15). Reflecting on the leadership competencies 
that the contemporary NHS demands, Pam Skinner suggests that clinical 
psychologists as a professional group possess the personal qualities, values, and 
skills in relationship building, reflectiveness, and emotional awareness that make 
them ideally suited to leadership in the contemporary NHS (Skinner, 2011). Steve 
Onyett (2012) agrees that clinical psychologists are well suited for leadership 
roles, constructing the clinical psychologist as a professional with the strong 
relational competencies and the emotional intelligence2 required by leaders in 
today’s pressured NHS. Drawing on psychoanalytic notions of personal 
vulnerability, he also suggests that, in exercising leadership, clinical 
psychologists should also seek to understand their shadow side3 in “achieving 
personal wholeness as a leader or anyone exercising power” (p.15). Antebi 
(2012) has recommended clinical psychologists for leadership on the basis that 
good leaders require emotional intelligence to “model the culture, the tone, and 
the right behaviours expected” of staff within the organisation and to have the 
                                                             
2 Goleman (1998) defines emotional intelligence as a combination of self-awareness, the 
capacity to manage one’s own emotions, and social awareness. 
3 The shadow side is a Jungian concept, one that refers to aspects of the self that are 






“robustness” and “resilience” to welcome interpersonal conflict (p. 22). Moyes 
(2012) agrees that “personal resilience” is a key quality of clinical psychologists 
as “calm, strong, admirable, moral leaders” (p. 28).  
1.5. Contexts in which the Idea of Clinical Psychologist’s Distress has been 
Spoken About. 
While it could be said that the personhood of the clinical psychologist has 
become an increasingly legitimised consideration within the profession of Clinical 
Psychology over the years, talk of clinical psychologist’s distress has continued to 
be somewhat circumscribed. Some of the ways in which clinical psychologist’s 
distress has been considered by the profession over the years will be reviewed, 
with a brief consideration of the implications for the profession.  
1.5.1. Personal Therapy 
Personal therapy, central to the theory and practice of psychotherapy, has 
historically been a contentious issue for the profession of Clinical Psychology 
(Gillmer & Marckus, 2003). The case has been made that there is insufficient 
evidence to justify making personal therapy a requirement (Macran & Shapiro, 
1998). However, the view that it is not a question of empirical evidence has also 
been asserted, in the argument that it is a moral imperative that the clinical 
psychologist, as someone charged to care for others, undertake personal therapy 
(Hughes & Youngson, 2009). Mollon (1989) suggested that Clinical Psychology 
training traditionally (naively in his opinion) assumed that psychologists “should 
somehow be healthy enough, well-adjusted enough not to need help themselves 
as if psychologists and their clients have to be kept in clearly differentiated 
categories” (p.10). It could be argued that there is some evidence for this 
distinction being made between clinical psychologists and their clients in 
professional guidance where personal distress experienced by the clinical 
psychologist is presented as a possibility, rather than an inevitability. For 
example, in the BPS accreditation guidelines that put the onus on courses to give 
trainees assistance in obtaining help “if” they experience “stress or psychological 







Conversations about supervision have also entailed some consideration of the 
possibility of clinical psychologist distress. Scaife (2003) advocates that 
supervision should be a safe space for the supervisee to share anxieties, feelings 
of inadequacy, and mental pain in order to inform the work of therapy. However, it 
has been suggested that the safety of talk of distress by the supervisee in this 
space cannot be assumed. Shiela Youngson, reflecting on her experience of 
training supervision in the 1970s, stated that: “if personal feelings and emotional 
responses to the work were mentioned, usually this was taken to be a sign of 
over-involvement at best and inappropriate emotional liability at worst” (Hughes & 
Youngson, 2009, p.17). Pilgrim and Treacher (1992) suggested that the 
availability of supervision as a space in which personal issues, and emotional 
responses to the work, can be discussed by the clinical psychologist is 
dependent on whether the supervisor “has been trained within a model which 
legitimises the exploration of difficult personal issues” (p.124).  
The current DCP guidelines on supervision advise that supervision can provide a 
reflective space in which “strong emotions” and “a high level of personal 
disclosure4” are likely and that a good relationship between supervisor and 
supervisee is, therefore, crucial (Dooley & Peyton-Lander, 2014, p.7). These 
guidelines advise that supervision should offer support and a space for the 
supervisee to reflect on the personal impact of the work, but caution that clear 
boundaries are necessary to delineate supervision from personal therapy. It 
should be noted that, according to these guidelines, the primary purpose of 
supervision is “to ensure the safety and quality of care and treatment for service 
users” (p.4). Hence, supervisors have a regulatory role in addition to a 
development role and a duty to consider “concerns about fitness to practice” 
when hearing expressions of distress by their supervisees (Dooley & Peyton-
                                                             
4 Disclosure is the term most commonly used in literature and research to refer to a 
psychologist’s talk about their personal experience, including experiences of distress. This 
term is used advisedly here and elsewhere in the thesis to reflect its use in the literature and 
research under discussion. It should be noted that this terminology has particular 
implications. Disclosure in common parlance evokes the notion of the sharing of secret or 
hidden information (see “Disclosure”, 2021). As such, this language contributes to a 







Lander, 2014, p.9). Furthermore, the DCP recognise that the formative and 
normative aspects of supervision are becoming more dominant, subjugating the 
traditional reflective space component of supervision, because of the increasing 
emphasis in healthcare systems on performance management (Dooley & Peyton-
Lander, 2014).  
1.5.3. Personal Development 
The concept of personal development emerged in the context of the conversation 
within the profession about reflective practice, and initiatives within training 
courses to support trainees to develop the capacity to reflect on their practice. 
Sheikh, Milne and MacGregor (2007), who proposed a model for Personal 
Professional Development (PPD) for training courses, suggested that PPD helps 
trainees to develop their reflective abilities, enhances their self-awareness, and 
builds their resilience. In 2004, there was an increased emphasis given in the 
accreditation criteria for Clinical Psychology training on learning outcomes for 
PPD (BPS, 2004). These criteria have been interpreted in various ways by 
different courses, with differing emphases on the personhood of the psychologist 
and potential for personal distress. According to Hughes and Youngson (2009), 
from the Leeds training programme, personal development brings the 
personhood of the clinical psychologist back to the centre of the work. They 
suggested that strong emotion will be evoked in the trainee engaging in PPD. In 
Leeds PPD groups, trainees are encouraged to share aspects of their personal 
‘selves’, a process that trainees have reported various levels of comfort with in 
course feedback (Hughes & Youngson, 2009). Mearns (1997) opined that it is 
extremely useful to take part in a group where “it is permissible to articulate 
feelings of inadequacy, incompetence, helplessness, and shame in the 
knowledge that such feelings will be respected and understood, and will not be 
taken as signs of weakness or professional uselessness” (p.26). However, 
Mearns speaks from the Counselling Psychology perspective, a discipline that 
has historically placed a greater emphasis on personal development in training. 
Hughes and Youngson (2009), reflecting on Mearn’s statement, have suggested 
that Clinical Psychology trainees, who may have less experience engaging in 
reflection and talking about the self, may be more inclined to find this experience 






workshop on PPD attended by the seventeen Clinical Psychology training 
courses was that “PPD necessarily invites a deconstruction of self during training, 
which is in direct conflict with the super-competent image demanded of trainee 
applicants” (p.20). Woodward, Keville and Conlan (2015) reported that trainees 
described a number of benefits of PPD, including increased self-awareness, 
greater self-acceptance, and a greater willingness to bring the personal self, 
including talk about emotional experiences, into the professional domain. 
Participants in their study reportedly constructed this talk of the personal in 
professional contexts as a process that facilitates reflective practice, but also as 
relational risk-taking, with the risk being that this talk may be considered 
unacceptable by others in the professional context (Woodward et al., 2015).  
1.5.4. Self-Care 
Clinical psychologist’s distress has also been spoken about in conversations, 
literature, and guidelines utilising a discourse of ‘self-care’. Much of the literature 
base for practices stemming from the self-care concept originates in the USA, 
and it is a concept linked to the concept of impairment in this literature (e.g., 
Barnett & Cooper, 2009; O’Connor, 2001; Sherman & Thelen, 1998). Self-care 
has been described, in moral and ethical terms, as an imperative, on the basis of 
its theorised link to competence in the practice of professional care for others 
(e.g., Norcross & Barnett, 2008; Wise, Hersh & Gibson, 2012). The DCP 
guidelines for practice produced in 1995 referenced self-care in relation to 
safeguarding fitness to practice, putting the onus on the clinical psychologist to 
monitor the effects of the work on their psychological and emotional wellbeing, 
and to take action where there is a risk of their personal wellbeing negatively 
affecting their professional practice (DCP, 1995). The BPS Practice Guidelines 
similarly framed self-care as a professional obligation (BPS, 2017). Myers, 
Sweeney, Popick and colleagues (2012) defined self-care as the use of 
strategies by the individual that promote psychological or emotional wellbeing, 
strategies they conceptualised within an individualist framework as: “sleep, 
exercise, use of social support, emotion regulation strategies, and mindfulness 
practice” (p.57). Wise and colleagues (2012) mobilised a discourse of ethics to 
promote the practice of Mindfulness Meditation as a form of self-care. They 






their awareness of internal experience, with a view to increasing their motivation 
to engage in other self-care activities, such as exercise, time with loved ones, 
and time in nature (Wise et al. 2012). A large systematic review found support for 
the practice of mindfulness in reducing distress and improving some aspects of 
work performance and some indices of wellbeing (i.e. job satisfaction) in 
healthcare workers (Lomas, Medina, Ivtzan et al., 2018). However, the 
researchers noted that the quality of the studies was inconsistent. In the UK 
context, there is some support for the utility of a mindfulness group in promoting a 
self-care culture among Clinical Psychology trainees during training (Hemanth & 
Fisher, 2015).  
1.5.5. Talk of Clinical Psychologist’s Distress in the Public Domain 
Personal therapy, reflective practice, and supervision are spaces less public, with 
talk of personal distress by clinical psychologists kept private or confidential to 
some degree. Over the years, a number of clinical psychologists have chosen to 
make public their experiences of personal distress in social and mainstream 
media. Clinical psychologists have spoken about having been users of mental 
health services prior to professional training and of experiencing, and accessing 
treatment for, personal distress post-qualification (e.g., Chadwick, 1997; Hughes, 
2016; May, 2000; McCourt, 1999). These psychologists have emphasised that 
their personal experience of distress informs and enriches their work as clinical 
psychologists. The BPS guidance on disability (Harper, Rowlands & Youngson, 
2006) validates this position and advises training bodies that increasing access 
for individuals with a history of personal psychological distress can enrich the 
profession, as individuals with lived experience of distress and its treatment can 
offer a unique insight to their colleagues. While there have been many voices 
raised in support of these narratives of personal experience of distress shared by 
psychologists, it should be noted that the reception to sharing of experiences of 
personal distress by members of the profession is not overwhelmingly positive. In 
a letter to The Psychologist, one clinical psychologist described these narratives 
as personal confessions and stated his view that material of this nature was 






Clinical psychologist’s distress has increasingly been a topic of interest in 
mainstream and social media in recent years, perhaps spurred by the 
dissemination and discussion, through BPS social and print media, of the findings 
of a BPS/New Savoy partnership survey reporting high levels of depression in 
psychological therapists working in the NHS (Barnett, 2016). These have tended 
to be different types of narratives, with less emphasis on the experience of 
distress as helpful in the work. An anonymous clinical psychologist, practising in 
the NHS at the time, wrote a piece for The Guardian newspaper speaking about 
how difficult it is to be depressed while in practice as a psychologist (Anonymous, 
2016, Feb. 9th). In another piece in the same newspaper, clinical psychologists 
Jay Watts and Anne Cooke profess to be unsurprised by the finding of the 2016 
wellbeing survey (Cooke & Watts, 2016, Feb.17th). They propose that 
psychologists working in the NHS are distressed because caring in the NHS is 
under attack from relentless targets and the prioritisation of these targets over the 
wellbeing of staff by managers. 
1.5.6. Constructions of Distress in Mental Health Professionals in Research 
A negative impact of the work on mental health professionals has been 
conceptualised as ‘compassion fatigue’, ‘vicarious traumatisation’, ‘stress’, and 
‘burnout’ in the literature.  
Compassion fatigue is conceptualised as a post-traumatic stress reaction that 
occurs in mental health professionals who work routinely with clients who have 
had traumatic experiences (Figley, 1995, 2002). For Figley (2002), “compassion 
is to bear suffering” (p.434), and compassion fatigue is an inability in the 
professional to continue to bear the suffering of clients in the course of the 
therapeutic work (Figley, 2002). The term compassion fatigue is sometimes used 
interchangeably with the term vicarious traumatisation. Vicarious traumatisation is 
described as a constellation of experiences in the clinician that resemble the 
expression of distress that attracts a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
within a psychiatric model, i.e. intrusive re-experiencing of traumatic material, 
avoidance, and hyperarousal (McCann & Pearlman, 1990). 
Stress is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “a state of mental or 






(“Stress”, 2019). Burnout is a term used to describe a particular type of work-
related stress response in professionals who work in people-oriented professions. 
Burnout was defined by Maslach (1982) as the experience of chronic exhaustion, 
de-personalisation and emotional distancing, accompanied by a feeling of failure 
or a sense of reduced personal accomplishment. Maslach (1982) hypothesised 
that individuals who work in the caring professions are more likely to experience 
burnout because of the routine exposure to the suffering of others and highly 
emotional situations, a hypothesis that has parallels with the conceptualisation of 
clinician distress as a traumatic stress response to exposure to the distress of 
others. It has been suggested that the nature of a psychologist’s role predisposes 
them to experiencing burnout because it entails a heightened sensitivity to 
people, a need to prioritise other’s needs over their own, and the tolerance of 
intense emotion coupled with the withholding of personal emotional responses 
(O’Connor, 2001). However, subsequent conceptualisations of burnout have 
placed more emphasis on wider systemic factors. Maslach and Leiter (2008) 
proposed six work environmental sources of burnout: work overload, lack of 
control, insufficient reward, perceived unfairness, breakdown of community, and 
values conflict. The demand-control model of burnout (Karasek, 1979) theorised 
that high strain jobs, defined as jobs high on demand and low on control (with 
control defined by the factors skill discretion and decision authority), are most 
likely to cause a mental strain on employees. Johnson and Hall (1988) included 
the dimension of social support, hypothesising that high control can buffer an 
employee against high demand in the work context when there is also high social 
support. Successive reviews have found support for this model (Häusser, 
Mojzisch, Niesel et al., 2010; Stansfeld & Candy, 2006; van der Doef & Maes, 
1999).  
1.6. Review of Existing Research 
1.6.1. Search Strategy 
The databases ‘Psycinfo’, ‘Psycarticles’, and ‘Medline’ were searched using the 
search terms: “Stress" OR "Chronic Stress" OR "Environmental Stress" OR 
"Occupational Stress" OR "Post-Traumatic Stress" OR "Psychological Stress" OR 






"Stress Reactions" OR DE "Compassion Fatigue” OR DE “Vicarious 
Traumatization” AND “clinical psychologists" or “clinical psychology” OR “Mental 
Health Workers”. The search was limited to results in the English language from 
peer-reviewed journals. Literature pertaining to a non-UK context was excluded. 
Additional relevant references within these texts returned by these searches were 
also sourced.  
The searches were also run with the inclusion of the search terms “Anxiety” and 
“Depression”, but the inclusion of these terms returned an unworkable number of 
texts pertaining to the work of clinical psychologists with clients experiencing 
anxiety and depression, irrelevant to this study. As such, these terms were 
omitted in subsequent searches. 
1.6.2. Distress in Mental Health Workers: Prevalence Estimates 
There is evidence that levels of distress are higher for health professionals 
working in the NHS than for any other professional group (Borril, Wall, West et 
al., 1998), and that mental health professionals, i.e. psychiatrists, psychologists, 
nurses, and social workers are at particularly high risk for experiencing burnout 
(Onyett, Pullinger & Muijen, 1997; Thomsen, Soares, Nolan et al., 1999). In 2016, 
an NHS staff survey reported that 37% of respondents reported feeling unwell 
due to work-related stress, 41% of NHS staff in mental health services (Barnett, 
2016). Although not directly comparable, as the operationalisation of the 
construct of distress in measurement differs, these surveys would seem to 
suggest that the prevalence of distress in NHS workers is higher than in the 
general population. The Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey (APMS) reported that 
approximately 17% of adults (19% of women) surveyed in England met the 
criteria for a common mental disorder, i.e. anxiety or depression (McManus, 
Bebbington, Jenkins et al., 2016).  
1.6.3. Distress in Clinical Psychologists: Prevalence Estimates 
There is a dearth of research investigating distress in clinical psychologists as a 
professional group specifically. As a whole, existing studies suggest that UK 
clinical psychologists experience levels of distress comparable with the levels of 
distress reported for other mental health professionals. In 1996, Cushway and 






psychologists carried about between 1992 and 1996. They reported the finding in 
earlier studies that 30% of their sample of clinical psychologists reached 
caseness5 on the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ: Goldberg & Williams 
1988) (Cushway & Tyler, 1994). In later studies, they reported that 40% reached 
caseness on the same measure (Cushway & Tyler, 1996). A systematic review of 
seven studies investigating stress and coping in UK clinical psychologists 
concluded that up to four in ten clinical psychologists reported personal distress 
at a level that indicated the presence of a diagnosable mental health problem6 
(Hannigan, Edwards & Burnard, 2004).  
There is some evidence that the lifetime prevalence of distress is higher for 
clinical psychologists than population norms. In recent study of 678 qualified UK 
clinical psychologists, 62.7% of respondents reported experience of a mental 
health problem, either in the past or at the time of survey completion (Tay, Alcock 
& Scior, 2018). The reported lifetime prevalence of distress (as diagnosable 
mental health problems) among adults in the UK is 41% (Mental Health 
Foundation, 2016). 
An early study that assessed levels of stress in British Clinical Psychology 
trainees reported an estimated prevalence of psychological problems, assessed 
using the GHQ-28, of 59%, with 75% describing themselves as moderately or 
severely stressed (Cushway,1992). In subsequent studies, high percentages of 
Clinical Psychology trainees reported significant problems in the areas of self-
esteem, anxiety and depression: 25% of 183 trainees in a study by Kuyken, 
Peters, Power and Lavender in 1998; and 41% of 364 trainees in a study by 
Brooks, Holtum and Lavender in 2002. In a recent survey of 348 Clinical 
Psychology trainees, 67% of respondents reported experiencing a mental health 
problem over the lifespan (a binary choice, with trainees asked to select the 
problem from a list of psychiatric diagnoses), with 29% reporting this as a current 
problem at the time of survey completion (Grice, Alcock & Scior, 2018). 
                                                             
5 Caseness refers to psychiatric caseness – whereby, if the respondent presented in a 
medical or mental health setting, reporting these experiences, they would be likely to receive 
further attention from professionals (Jackson, 2007). 
6 The term ‘mental health problem’ is used here and in the subsequent section to reflect its 
use in the research under discussion. It should be noted that this term has particular 
implications for the way distress is constructed as it is a term often used alongside terms that 






A survey of NHS staff published in 2016 reported that 46% of psychology 
professionals described themselves as depressed, with 25% reporting a long-
term chronic condition (Barnett, 2016). Furthermore, 70% of respondents 
reported finding their job stressful, and 49.5% reported considering themselves a 
failure. These findings show a slight increase from a survey of NHS psychology 
professionals in 2014, in which 40% of respondents reported feeling depressed, 
and 40.2% reported feelings of failure (Rao, Clarke, Bhutani et al., 2017). In a 
2017 survey, there was a slight decrease in reported levels of depression (43%) 
and feelings of failure (42%), but it should be noted that the lowest levels of 
reporting were also in 2017 (Rao et al., 2017). Clinical psychologists formed the 
largest proportion of respondents (48.5%) in these surveys (Rao et al., 2017). In 
a recent survey of 298 NHS psychological therapists investigating burnout7, 
78.9% of respondents were classified as suffering from high burnout and 58.1% 
were classified as experiencing high disengagement from the emotional 
experience of clients (Johnson, Corker & O’Connor, 2020).  
While these studies appear to support a conclusion that distress in trainee and 
qualified clinical psychologists is a significant problem, results should be 
interpreted with caution. There are significant issues entailed with a self-report 
method of data collection and the survey methods utilised by all of the studies. 
Self-selection and reporting biases should be taken into consideration in 
interpreting results. In addition, direct comparison is complicated by the differing 
constructions of distress utilised in various studies and the differences in the way 
these constructs were operationalised in measurement. 
1.6.4. Theorising Causal Factors 
There is evidence from US studies that organisational factors play a greater role 
in burnout experienced by mental health professionals than individual factors, 
particularly in the context of roles involving high patient contact, with work 
pressures and low control consistently found to correlate with burnout (Lasalvia, 
Bonetto & Bertani, 2009; Schulz, Greenley, Brown et al.,1995). Lasalvia and 
colleagues (2009) found support for the demand-control-support model of 
                                                             
7 This study utilised the Demerouti & Bakker (2008) model of burnout, a two-factor model 
conceptualising burnout as a psychological syndrome whereby psychological therapists feel 






burnout in a study with community-based mental health staff. They reported that 
the best predictors of burnout were roles with higher levels of face-to-face contact 
with patients and three organisational factors: workgroup cohesion, perceived 
fairness, and control.  
There is some evidence from the series of studies of stress and coping in UK 
psychologists by Cushway and Tyler (1994, 1996) that organisational stressors 
for qualified clinical psychologists are similar to those reported by other 
professional groups in the NHS, namely: pressure of workload, lack of resources, 
interpersonal conflict with other professionals, and poor communication and 
management within the organisation. Experienced psychologists reported less 
stress than less experienced psychologists in their series of studies. However, 
levels of stress were found to decrease for men with an increase in grade, but not 
for women. The researchers theorised that this was due to multiple role strain for 
women, who were likely to have more responsibilities in the home context. They 
reported that client factors, such as client distress and client behaviour, were 
particular stressors for clinical psychologists, but that professional self-doubt or 
uncertainty about effectiveness in the role was the largest individual factor 
predicting psychologist distress (Cushway & Tyler, 1996). A review of seven 
studies of stress and coping in UK clinical psychologists concluded that there is 
evidence that the factors: client characteristics, excessive workloads, 
professional self-doubt, and poor management all contribute to higher stress 
levels in clinical psychologists (Hannigan et al., 2004). 
1.6.5.Theorising Individual Differences in Distress and Coping 
Acknowledgement of the experience of stress by the psychologist and an active 
attempt to manage stress was the approach to coping most strongly associated 
with lower levels of stress in the Cushway and Tyler (1992, 1994, 1996) series of 
studies. Talking to a friend or colleague was the coping strategy most frequently 
cited as helpful by their respondents and was negatively correlated with stress. 
Conversely, a reliance on avoidance coping strategies involving denial or refusal 
to acknowledge stress was correlated with higher levels of stress (Cushway & 
Tyler, 1996). The review by Hannigan and colleagues (2004) concluded that 






seeking are the most effective approaches to stress management for clinical 
psychologists. 
Brooks and colleagues (2002) reported that trainees who had personality traits8 
that indicated a reduced likelihood of seeking support from others or attempting 
to exercise control over their environment were more likely to report suffering 
from anxiety, depression, and low self-esteem. In a longitudinal study, trainees 
who reported experiencing demands as manageable and having more access to 
support at time one reported less avoidance coping, less anxiety and depression, 
and higher self-esteem at time two (Kuyken, Peters, Power et al., 2003). 
Specifically, access to support in the home was associated with less avoidance 
coping by trainees at work, and less avoidance coping had a positive moderating 
effect on levels of anxiety, depression and self-esteem (Kuyken et al., 2003). 
Increased access to social support in the workplace was associated with trainees 
reporting a greater sense of control and less avoidance coping in the workplace, 
and achieving lower scores for anxiety and depression, and higher scores for 
self-esteem (Kuyken et al., 2003).  
In study with 298 qualified psychological therapists, higher quality supervisory 
relationships were associated with lower levels of emotional disengagement from 
clients but not lower levels of emotional exhaustion (Johnson et al., 2020), a 
factor that previous studies have linked to demand (Miller, 2018). The quality of 
supervisory relationships was measured using the safe base subscale of the 
Short Supervisory Relationship Questionnaire (S-SRQ: Cliffe, Beinart, & Cooper, 
2016). The safe-base subscale purports to measure the extent to which the 
supervisee experiences the supervisory relationship as safe, respectful, and 
collaborative (Cliffe et al., 2016). 
1.6.6. Barriers to Accessing Support 
While available research indicates the value for clinical psychologists of taking an 
active approach to coping with distress, including the use of both formal and 
informal social support, it has been suggested that talking to others about 
personal distress and help-seeking are not straightforward propositions for 
                                                             






clinical psychologists. Walsh and Cormack (1994) reported that the clinical 
psychologists they interviewed perceived the idea of disclosing distress and 
seeking support as psychologically threatening, in part due to a perceived conflict 
between the experience of personal distress and the values of their profession 
and the health service organisation. Hannigan and colleagues (2004) concluded 
from their review that “powerful organisational and professional factors may act in 
ways that inhibit the capacity of psychologists to seek and obtain support for 
stress at work” (p.243). A subsequent study by Charlemagne-Odle, Harmon and 
Maltby (2012) provided further support for this conclusion. The clinical 
psychologists they interviewed reported that fears about being stigmatised by 
colleagues for experiencing distress, and the perceived need to maintain an 
appearance of coping, make it difficult for them to talk to others about the 
experience of personal distress. The researchers concluded that the barrier to 
disclosing distress and help-seeking is such that, if the psychologist's distress 
goes undetected by others, they may attempt to persevere in the same 
conditions, despite the impact of personal distress on their effectiveness at work 
(Charlemagne-Odle et al., 2012). Researchers proposed on the basis of their 
findings that clinical psychologists experience a conflict between their role or 
identity as a clinical psychologist, and the experience of distress and help-
seeking (Charlemagne-Odle et al., 2012).  
Grice, Alcock and Scior (2018) reported that the perceived stigma associated 
with a mental health problem coupled with what they referred to as maladaptive 
perfectionism (conceptualised as a quality of the individual) predicted whether 
trainee clinical psychologists would disclose their experience of distress to others. 
Tay and colleagues (2018) found that the qualified clinical psychologists in their 
study who had not told anyone about their experience of a mental health problem 
(11% of their sample) reported higher levels of self-stigma, indicating that they 
stigmatised themselves for having a mental health problem. These respondents 
also scored higher for feelings of shame about their experience of distress, and 
were more likely to report anticipating negative consequences for self-image 
(public and private) and career if they talked to others about experiencing mental 
health problems or engaged in help-seeking (Tay et al., 2018). Tay and 






spoken to a friend or family member about personal experience of a mental 
health problem. However, almost half of those who reported experience of a 
mental health problem had talked about the experience in a work setting. 
Contrary to the researcher’s initial hypothesis, formulated on the basis of 
evidence from research carried out with samples from the general population, 
rates of disclosure and help-seeking did not differ for clinical psychologists 
between those who reported mental health problems they classified as more 
stigmatised (i.e., psychosis/bipolar disorder), and those they classified as less 
stigmatised (i.e., anxiety/depression) (Tay et al., 2018). 
1.7. Rationale for the Current Study 
Distress is central to the work of the clinical psychologist. While the work of 
clinical psychologists with the distress of others has received much research 
attention to date, comparatively little attention has been accorded to the 
consideration of clinical psychologist’s personal experiences of distress and 
distress management. Research evidence available, and anecdotal evidence 
from social and mainstream media, suggests that distress is a significant issue 
for members of the profession of Clinical Psychology. There is also evidence that 
there are factors that complicate the acknowledgement of personal distress by 
clinical psychologists and help-seeking. This research hopes to further the 
understanding of the experience of personal distress by clinical psychologists in 
the NHS by exploring the discursive resources that clinical psychologists draw on 
to construct distress experienced by clinical psychologists and how discourses 
drawn on shape social practices.  
1.7.1. Research Questions 
o How do participants construct a clinical psychologist’s experience of 
distress in relation to their professional identity? 
o How do the discursive resources drawn on shape their accounts of how 
psychologist distress has been responded to and how they think it should 






2. CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter, the epistemological and ontological positions underpinning this 
research are outlined, including the key assumptions made in the adoption of 
these positions. Subsequently, the procedure followed in seeking ethical 
approval, recruiting participants, and collecting data is elaborated. This is 
followed by a detailed description of the approach to data analysis. Lastly, the 
reflexivity concerns that have been an important consideration throughout the 
study will be introduced, as will evaluation criteria for the study, both of which 
receive further consideration in chapter four.  
2.1. Epistemology and Ontology 
2.1.1. Critical Realism 
The epistemological and ontological positions adopted in this study are consistent 
with the three elements of Critical Realism, as expounded by Pilgrim (2020). 
First and foremost, it is ontologically realist. Ontology can be defined as the study 
of being and existence in the world (Burr, 1998). To adopt a Critical Realist 
ontological position is to allow for an independent reality to the natural world and 
our social structures, a reality that exists outside of our understanding of it and 
has real causal effects (Pilgim, 2020). This study is ontologically realist in the 
assumption that there is a reality to the experience of distress, and in the 
attribution of causal effects to an independently existing reality, though it is 
acknowledged that the historical and cultural context will shape participant’s 
understandings, experience of, and relationship with this reality, including how 
distress is experienced.  
Secondly, it is epistemologically relativist. Epistemology can be defined as the 
philosophy of the nature of knowledge, of what it is possible to know, and how we 
can know it (Willig, 2013). Critical Realism assumes an ontological reality, but 
that this reality can only be known through the imperfect lens of our sensory 
capacities as social beings (Bhaskar, 1997). As such, it is assumed that all 
knowledge is partial and subject to revision (Chamberlain, 2015). Thus, Critical 
Realism problematises claims of any kind of direct access to reality, including 






world (Bhaskar, 1997). This relativist epistemological position, consistent with 
some moderate Social Constructionist positions, encourages suspicion of taken-
for-granted understandings of the world, thereby opening up space for curiosity 
about our knowledge of the world as human beings. Knowledge, both theoretical 
and taken-for-granted understandings of the world, is understood to be socially 
constructed, objectified, institutionalised, and internalised by human beings 
through processes of primary and secondary socialisation into a historically and 
culturally defined symbolic world (Berger & Luckmann,1966/1991). Thus, human 
subjectivity is hypothesised to be constructed by social processes, and involved 
in the active construction of social reality in collaborative, dynamic, social 
processes (Berger & Luckmann, 1966/1991). Reciprocal habitual patterns of 
behaviour by actors are theorised to become institutionalised, accepted as ‘the 
way things are done’, with this institutionalisation acting as a mechanism of social 
control operating to sustain a particular social order (Berger & Luckmann, 
1966/1991). Knowledge, as truth, is taken to be the currently accepted ways of 
understanding the world, in a particular historical and cultural context, and, as 
these socially constructed ‘truths’ dictate what it is permissible for human beings 
to do, and to do to others, the social construction of reality is considered 
inextricably bound up with social action and power relations (Burr, 1995). While 
not attributing reality in its entirety to these constructionist processes, this study 
accords with Gergen (1985) in the view that the way people describe and explain 
the world (including themselves), through language, is social action that functions 
to sustain particular patterns in a given social reality, to the exclusion of others. 
This study adopts an epistemologically relativist position in its concern with the 
construction by participants of the social reality they inhabit in the role of clinical 
psychologist in the institution of mental healthcare in the NHS, and the focus on 
the ways that these constructions of social reality structure their lived experience 
in this context, by facilitating or limiting, enabling or constraining, what can be 
said and done by the clinical psychologist (i.e., ‘ways of being’).  
The third element proposed by Pilgrim (2020) is the notion of judgemental 
rationality, which is the idea that human beings are capable of the evaluation of 
knowledge claims, and of making moral and rational judgements. The notion of 






discourse, as knowledge, while also allowing space for a subject with agency 
who can weigh up the ‘truths’ at their disposal and make choices as regards 
social action. Thus, clinical psychologists are conceptualised as both “determined 
and determining beings” (Pilgrim, 2020, p.25), products of socialisation processes 
but also subjects with agency who actively contribute to the construction of social 
reality. 
2.2. Procedure 
2.2.1. Ethical Approval 
The University of East London Research Ethics Committee granted ethical 
approval for the study (appendix A). Ethical issues were an important 
consideration in this study, as in all qualitative research which entails 
“researching private lives and placing accounts in the public arena” (Birch, Miller, 
Mauthner et al., 2002, p.1). Participants were provided with information on the 
study at two time-points, once prior to expressing interest and again prior to the 
interview. A participant de-briefing sheet, with sources of support for 
psychological distress, was sent to each participant after their interview (appendix 
B). Interviews were anonymised at the point of data collection and deleted from 
the dictaphone after transfer to the researcher’s password-protected computer. 
Participants were initially differentiated by number (i.e., CP 1) and assigned 
pseudonyms in the latter stages of data analysis. Participant’s names were not 
linked to the data at any point.  
Ethical research practice was viewed as an ongoing process of reflection and 
openness to tensions, ambivalences and dilemmas in the areas of informed 
consent, confidentiality, consequences of the research, and role of the 
researcher. These areas were conceptualised as “fields of uncertainty” rather 
than areas in which ethical questions could be considered resolved at the point of 
research design (Brinkman & Kvale, 2017, p.261). The topic could be considered 
a sensitive topic, and the community of clinical psychologists in the UK a 
relatively small and well-connected community. When sampling from a smaller 
and more well-connected population the risk of breaching confidentiality is 
considered greater (Damianakis & Woodford, 2012). One participant contacted 






reconstructed from demographic, training, and employment information in 
combination with quoted material. Morse (2008) made the point that, in qualitative 
research, numerous identity tags linked with pseudonyms and quotations can 
threaten anonymity. Taking these factors into consideration, the choice was 
made to report more general demographic information about participants and to 
use ranges rather than exact figures for each specific participant. Any reference 
to specific courses, specific services, localities, or individuals in the data was 
substituted at the point of transcription.  
2.2.2. Recruitment 
A purposive sampling method was used to recruit nine clinical psychologists 
currently practising in the NHS. A number of factors were taken into account to 
make the decision about sample size. Constraints of time and resources, and the 
awareness that a larger amount of data could preclude a deep, complex 
engagement with the data (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005), were balanced against 
the need to gather sufficiently rich data for the study to be considered to make a 
useful contribution. Braun and Clarke (2013) have recommended that the 
anticipated richness of data should be a consideration in deciding the amount of 
data required. It was anticipated that a sample of clinical psychologists would 
provide relatively rich data, as clinical psychologists are a population of 
academics accustomed to speaking about and reflecting on experience, and the 
topic was anticipated to be of personal relevance to participants. This study was 
considered exploratory, one that aimed to indicate rather than conclude, and the 
analytic approach inductive, requiring a depth of analysis that was anticipated to 
be more time and labour intensive. A smaller sample size has been 
recommended in qualitative studies of this nature (Crouch & McKenzie, 2006). 
While this study does not adopt a discourse analytic method, as such, there was 
an interpretative phase to the analysis informed by discursive theory, which was 
anticipated to be more labour intensive, and smaller sample sizes are 
recommended in studies using discourse analytic methods (Georgaca & Avdi, 
2012). Additionally, the concept of saturation was reflected upon in considering 
the relationship between sample size and sufficiently rich data, with saturation 
defined as the point at which carrying out further interviews fails to generate new 






and saturation in qualitative research, found that saturation was reached in 
twelve interviews, and basic meta-themes were present in six interviews (Guest, 
Bunce & Johnson, 2006).  
A sample size of 9, while small for a study using Thematic Analysis (TA), is 
comparable to some published TA studies in similar areas of interest or drawing 
from similar study populations. For example, a study of paranoia in a student 
population with a sample of seven (Harper & Timmons, 2019) and a study 
exploring experiences of mandatory personal therapy in professional training with 
nine trainee clinical psychologists (Ivey & Corné Waldeck, 2014). 
Participants were recruited through an invitation posted by the researcher on the 
social media site Twitter (appendix C), which included a link to the participant 
invitation letter (appendix D). Inclusion criteria were broad as it was anticipated 
that recruitment to the study would be difficult. As previously noted, the topic was 
judged, in dialogue with supervisors and peers, to be sensitive. Furthermore, the 
sample was drawn from a population who are time-pressured. Individuals 
currently working in the NHS as clinical psychologists for at least one year were 
invited to participate. The sample was expected to be homogenous with respect 
to the fact that they were all clinical psychologists working in the NHS at the time 
of the study, with some variation expected within that but not specifically recruited 
for. Given the dearth of previous research in the area, it was difficult to predict 
variables that it might be important to seek variation on. Discussions did take 
place early on in supervision as to whether to recruit for clinical psychologists 
who self-identified as having lived experience of distress. It was decided, as this 
concept is sometimes linked in the literature to experience of distress that has 
attracted a functional diagnosis, this could constitute a pre-narrowing of the 
definition of the construct of ‘distress’, a concept purposefully chosen for its 
polysemic nature.  
2.2.3. Participants 
The clinical psychologists who opted to participate in the study were all female. 
Seven participants defined their ethnicities as White British, two as Asian British. 
Age ranges: 25-35 (3), 36-45 (4), 45-60 (2). Length of time in practice as qualified 






participants worked in London or surrounding areas, and five worked in other 
parts of Britain. Settings participants worked in included: forensics, 
neuropsychology, community mental health, physical health, and mental health. 
Including Clinical Psychology courses that participants had trained on and those 
they had been involved with as members of the course team, participants had 
lived experience of ten different Clinical Psychology training courses.  
2.2.4. Data Collection 
Each participant was given the option of being interviewed one-to-one by the 
researcher at a venue of their choosing or via Skype. One interviewee chose to 
be interviewed at her home, one at a coffee shop, one at the university campus, 
the remaining six over Skype. Of the six interviewed over Skype, five were at 
home at the time of the interview, and one was in her workplace. Interview 
duration was between one hour and one hour thirty minutes.  
A semi-structured approach to interviewing was used, using an interview 
schedule developed in consultation with supervisors and colleagues (appendix 
E). As the study was exploratory, and due to the dearth of research in the area, 
the questions were intentionally broad and open to interpretation by the 
interviewee. They were designed to evoke descriptions of the clinical 
psychologist’s role and identity, descriptions of distress (both generally and as 
experienced by clinical psychologists), and to elicit participant’s ideas about 
helpful responses to distress experienced by clinical psychologists. The decision 
to ask broad questions was also taken with the awareness that more detailed 
questions could orient participant’s reflections in a particular way and position 
them in relation to certain constructs (Fairclough, 2014). Questions were also 
minimal to allow flexibility for the scope of the interview to broaden or change in 
response to emergent interview material. Prompts or follow-up questions aimed 
to follow the participant’s order and phrasing and focused on encouraging 
reflection, asking for clarification, and requesting explanation and illustration of 
concepts and metaphors used. Overall, the researcher intervened as little as 
possible so as not to interrupt the flow of the participant’s ideas. As each 
interview was conceptualised as a novel intersubjectively created context, and 






the interview schedule was not piloted, over and above discussion with 
supervisors and colleagues. 
Interviewees were forthcoming and reflective, and a comfortable and easy 
rapport was established between researcher and interviewee early on in each 
interview. It was indicated that interviewees positioned the researcher as a 
colleague by their regular use of phrases such as “you know” and the assumption 
that the researcher understood psychological terms and concepts used. This was 
most likely an advantage in terms of establishing rapport, but possibly a 
disadvantage in terms of generating richer descriptions of concepts and terms. 
The researcher tried to maintain an awareness of this positioning throughout and 
to make a point of asking for explanations and illustrations of terminology and 
concepts used by participants. It was noted that participants who were 
interviewed at home appeared particularly forthcoming in their interviews. This 
was commented on by one participant, and reflected on by the researcher in light 
of concerns about protecting participants anonymity. 
Data was recorded on a dictaphone and transcribed using a system of Jefferson 
Lite by the researcher in accordance with the conventions set out by Parker 
(1992). Adopting this style allowed certain key non-linguistic elements to be 
retained without the depth necessary for a conversation analysis. In extracts re-
produced in the results section, (..) indicates a pause and (…) indicates omitted 
material. 
2.3. Analytic Approach 
2.3.1. Thematic Analysis 
As the study was exploratory in nature a more flexible method was considered 
more appropriate. A method that would allow the researcher to move from a more 
descriptive macro view of the whole data set, to a focus on specific areas of 
interest in the data set, identified as the analysis developed, with a view to a 
deeper, more interpretative analysis of these areas of interest. Thematic Analysis 
(TA) is considered a method rather than methodology, as it does not provide a 
theoretically driven framework for data analysis (Terry, Hayfield, Clarke et al., 






across a sample, allows the researcher to make interpretations of the data that 
aim to construct a picture of the reality of the research participants (Joffe, 2012). 
In this study, interpretation of the data was informed by post-structuralist theory 
and discursive analytic traditions, resulting in an approach to data analysis that 
has been described by Braun and Clarke (2013) as a constructionist form of TA. 
A constructionist approach to data analysis was considered a good fit with the 
relativist epistemological assumptions, and offered scope for the consideration of 
how the topic was interpreted by participants and how ideas drawn on 
constructed their social realities.  
Other methodologies were considered. A Foucauldian Discourse Analytic 
approach (FDA) would have been compatible with the aim of the study to explore 
the construction of clinical psychologist’s subjectivities within the social context of 
the NHS through discourse, and would have allowed a consideration of the 
historical and cultural conditions of the production of these subjectivities, and a 
focus on the operation of power. However, this methodology does not allow much 
space for the agency of social actors, as subjectivity is conceptualised as 
constructed by the impress of power, through the operation of hegemonic 
discourse, on social actors (Willig, 2013). Discursive Analysis could have offered 
a methodology for an exploration of the subjectivity of the clinical psychologist as 
constructed in interaction (Wiggins & Potter, 2020), allowing for a consideration of 
agency in social processes. However, a traditional discursive approach does not 
readily allow the same consideration of the macro socio-political power relations 
(Weatherall, 1998). Furthermore, the use of both of these methodological 
frameworks necessitates that a specific focus is taken from the outset of the 
analysis, based on specific research questions, and, in the case of FDA, the clear 
identification from the outset of objects to be deconstructed (Braun & Clarke, 
2013). As such, both of these analytic approaches were considered incompatible 
with the exploratory nature of the study. A phenomenological approach would 
have been a good fit with the exploratory nature of the study, and could have 
offered a depth to the understanding of the subjective experiential aspects of 
clinical psychologist’s distress. However, this approach was considered 
incompatible with the relativist epistemological position, with research questions 






and with the study’s aim to go beyond representations of experience to de-
construct the social reality presented by participants. Furthermore, this study was 
intended to contribute to a reflexive critique of the profession of Clinical 
Psychology. It has been suggested that some phenomenological methodologies, 
such as Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA), do not lend themselves 
to a reflexive critique of the discipline of psychology, as they tend to privilege the 
psychological over socio-cultural interpretation (Braun & Clarke, 2013). 
2.3.2. Discursive Theory 
Post-structuralist theorists, most notably Foucault, proposed that psychological 
theories, such as theories of child development, of madness, badness, and 
personality, play a formative role in constructing the objects and subjects they 
claim to explain (Foucault, 1961/1965,1969/1972). From this perspective, 
language does not simply describe, but rather constructs our social and 
psychological reality through the operation of discourses, or systems of meaning, 
available within a given socio-cultural historical context (Georgaca & Avdi, 2015). 
These shared systems of meaning make available ways of seeing and ways of 
being, with implications for what may be done and are, as such, strongly 
implicated in the exercise of power (Willig, 2015). It has been argued that the 
discourses of psychology have shaped historicised subjectivities, producing a 
particular understanding of ‘self’ (Rose, 1999). Rose (1985, 1999) asserts that 
the ‘psy-professions’ (i.e., psychology, psychiatry, psychoanalysis) perform a 
powerful regulatory function in society by dictating how individuals understand 
themselves and act upon themselves, in essence how they govern themselves. 
This self-governance, which is the operation of power through discourse that 
constructs the regime of the self, stems from the relationship between meaning-
making and action. Talk and action are theorised to support and reinforce each 
other in the construction of subjects and objects, with the discourses drawn on in 
the construction of reality making certain actions possible, and actions in turn 
reinforcing the reality constructed through discourse (Willig, 2015). Parker has 
argued that discourses offer “an array of subject positions, and discursive 
complexes contain specifications for the types of object and shapes of 
subjectivity” (Parker, 1992, p.245). Parker (1992) defines a subject as a particular 






can step into or reject. Davies and Harré (1990) argue that subject positions are a 
key consideration in discursive practice, stating that “the constitutive force of 
each discursive practice lies in its provision of subject positions” (p.5). They 
describe positioning as inherently relational, as we position ourselves, and are 
positioned by others in relation to other people. Furthermore, they propose that 
there are culturally, socially, politically understood meanings attached to subject 
positions and, thus, subject positions facilitate, or even demand, certain 
behaviours, and as a subject position is associated with certain rights and duties, 
each subject position has moral consequences (Davies & Harré, 1990).  
The ‘psy-professions’ are theorised to have been themselves disciplined by the 
emergence of the regimes of selfhood they have played a key role in inventing 
and perpetuating (Rose, 1998). Poststructuralist theory offers a way of thinking 
about the social and psychological realities of clinical psychologists, their 
subjectivities (ways of thinking and feeling) and their social practices. A 
discursive approach facilitates the mapping of the discursive environment 
inhabited by the clinical psychologist, with a view to understanding the various 
ways professional identity can be constructed in this discursive environment and 
how these constructions shape the experience of, and ways of relating to, 
personal distress.  
Foucault has been critiqued for theorising a subject without agency (Hall, 2004). 
This study adopts an Althusserian view in thinking of professional identity as 
constructed through available discursive resources by the mechanism of 
interpellation, with clinical psychologists hailed by the ideologies, or discourses, 
embedded in their professional cultural context and experiencing the 
consequences of ideologies drawn on. From this perspective, interpellation is 
conceptualised as “a seductive power” (Hall, 2004, p.88) rather than a 
deterministic force. The Althusserian perspective allows for a view of an agentic 
subject as proposed by Pilgrim (2020). Davies and Harré (1990) align with this 
view, conceptualising subjects as choosing subjects who bring their own 
subjective lived histories to bear on their responses to how they are positioned, 
and how they position themselves in the narratives constructed in conversation. 
Hollway (1984) makes the point that without some notion of agency we are left 






position in one discourse rather than another. The consideration of power in 
analysis was at the level of the individual, the institution, and the broader social 
context. The institution (i.e., the Clinical Psychology profession, the mental health 
system) is considered to exert power in the creation of the discursive world of the 
clinical psychologist, particularly as regards determining the dominant discourses 
of this world, but the clinical psychologist is considered to have agency in 
choosing or investing in the various available discourses, and the subject 
positions they offer, in the construction of their professional identity. From this 
perspective, identity is a construction “in-process” (Belsey, 1985, p.169), always 
under construction in a process never completed, and the subject in-process is 
considered a site for resistance and change.  
2.3.3. Analytic Phases 
TA is conceptualised as an iterative, fluid, and recursive process (Terry, Hayfield, 
Clarke et al., 2017). A number of stages in the analytic process are elaborated, 
but it should be noted that these stages were not strictly linear. The process was 
iterative, with movement back and forth between stages during the process of 
analysis.  
Phase 1: Immersion and distance- treating the data as data.  
Analytic engagement with the data set began with a process of immersion in the 
data through listening to the audio files and transcribing the data. This process 
was progressed with a reading and re-reading of the entire transcribed data set, 
with an initial consideration of semantic and latent meaning and a noting of 
potential points of analytic interest. This facilitated a position of immersion and 
distance in relation to the data (Braun & Clarke, 2013). 
Phase 2: Complete coding  
Coding commenced with a complete coding of the data set, by hand, with an 
emphasis on more data-derived codes initially, progressing to more researcher-
derived codes as the analysis developed (see appendix F). A complete coding of 
the data set was considered an appropriate place to start as to commence with 
selective coding, as would be common in a pattern-based discourse analytic 






begin (Braun & Clarke, 2013). As the study was exploratory in nature with broad 
research questions, this complete coding was a way to identify the features of 
interest, instances, that were then more selectively coded for in subsequent 
stages.  
Phase 3: Selective coding- coding the text in light of the research question, 
informed by discursive theory.  
In the selective coding phase, the emphasis shifted to researcher-derived codes 
(see appendix G) bringing a theoretical understanding of language as productive 
to look beneath the surface of the data and consider how language was 
producing particular versions of reality (see appendix H). The discursive analytic 
phase of the analysis, informed by Parker (1992) and Willig (2015), focused on 
the following. 
o Discursive object(s): Coding was informed by the discursive object(s) of 
interest in this study. The main discursive object was ‘distress’, and the 
text was coded for explicit and implicit references to distress. The clinical 
psychologist and the profession of Clinical Psychology were also 
considered discursive objects for the purposes of coding the data. Codes 
represented the diversity of ways the discursive objects(s) were 
constructed in the text. 
 
o Discourses: The discourses drawn on by speakers constructing the 
object(s) were considered. Parker’s (1992) definition of discourse as: “a 
system of statements which constructs an object” (p.4) guided the process. 
A number of questions were asked to facilitate the consideration of 
discursive resources. For example: what picture of reality does this 
discourse present? How does this discourse connect with other 
discourses? Contradictions between different ways of describing 
something were considered through reflection on alternative discourses 
that could be used, and the differences and similarities in the objects as 
constituted by these discourses.  
 
o Subject positions: Following Davies and Harré (1999), subject positions 






interest was the position the speaker took up/was offered, in what 
narrative, and how this positioned them in relation to others. Images, 
metaphors, and analogies used were noted, and the ‘ways of being’ 
assumed or invoked by these rhetorical devices. The power, rights, and 
responsibilities of the various subject positions were reflected upon. 
 
o Practices: The opportunities for action opened up or closed down by the 
discourses drawn on were reflected on, with reference to the subject 
positions they made space for. The kinds of action made possible and 
disallowed by subject positions were considered, including who has the 
right or responsibility to perform these actions. 
Phase 4: Review of codes and development of candidate themes 
Codes were reviewed, with a return to the data set to check that there were 
sufficient codes to capture the patterning of meaning and diversity within the 
data. Codes that captured similar ideas were merged and some codes discarded 
(see appendix I). Codes that appeared to cluster together were collated in a 
similar place, initially on Nvivo, then also in word files to facilitate the inclusion of 
researcher interpretative notes. Additional coding took place as the analysis took 
shape, and some previously identified instances were rejected as no longer 
centrally relevant to the emerging narrative of the analysis. The analysis worked 
from codes to consideration of broader patterns of meaning across the data set 
and central organising concepts. Similarities and differences in ways of 
constructing the object/s, and the patterning of discursive meanings across the 
data set, were considered in the development of themes. A theme was defined as 
capturing something important about the data, with reference to the research 
questions (Braun and Clarke, 2006). This phase entailed a return to source 
material numerous times to check that the grouping of codes in developing 
themes was a good fit with the broader narrative of a participant’s interview. 
Themes were considered provisional at this stage. 
Phase 5: Review of themes 
Candidate themes were reviewed and assessed as to whether they could be 






whole data set, with a view to constructing an explanatory framework of the 
themes judged to be most important (Willig, 2013). Questions suggested by 
Braun and Clarke (2013) aided in the review of themes and revision: 
o Is this a theme or a code?  
o Does this theme tell me something useful about my dataset and the 
research questions? 
o What are the boundaries of this theme? 
o Is there enough meaningful data to support this theme? 
o Is the theme coherent? 
Phase 6: Refinement and naming of themes  
The focus and scope of each theme was defined, themes were named, links 
between themes and networks of meaning were constructed. This process also 
entailed a return to individual codes and coded data extracts, which facilitated the 
writing of brief summaries of each theme. 
Phase 7: Production of an analytic narrative of the analysis.  
At this stage, the consideration was the overall story that the themes could be 
said to tell about the topic. Relevant literature was re-considered at this point, and 
further literature sourced. The question of the operation of power through 
discourses drawn on was revisited, including who benefits or loses from the 
operation of a discourse. 
2.4. Reflexivity 
2.4.1. Personal Reflexivity 
As qualitative research concerns the construction of meanings, it is considered 
crucial that the researcher give careful consideration to what their identity 
contributes to the process (Willig, 2013). No qualitative researcher can be outside 
the process. As the researcher, I have considered my ‘self’ central to the 
construction of the meanings in this study. As a trainee clinical psychologist, I am 
part of the professional group I am researching. My interest in this topic stems 
from personal experience working in the NHS, entrenched in practices and 






experience of distress. Qualitative research has been characterised as an 
immersive process (Nelson & Prilleltensky, 2010), and I was already immersed in 
the context that I was researching to a degree. This could be considered a 
position of advantage as regards my familiarity with the discursive world inhabited 
by my participants. Discourses can be thought of as the institutionalised use of 
language, which can occur at the level of discipline (Davies & Harré, 1999). As 
pointed out by Parker (1992), discourses that operate within psychology may 
have a different meaning to those outside of this professional culture. However, 
the contribution of my professional identity and pre-existing relationship with this 
discursive world to the construction of meaning needed careful consideration. I 
considered the contribution that my professional identity, as viewed by 
participants, could make to the creation of the context for data collection, the 
political and moral commitments that my participants may have assumed from my 
Twitter account, and the UEL training course, and my contribution to the dialogue 
in the interviews. I considered these as influences that could lead participants to 
view the interview as a particular sort of occasion, invoking particular discourses 
to the exclusion of others. Considering positioning as relational, I endeavoured to 
maintain an awareness of my contribution to positioning participants in our 
conversations, how participants positioned me, and my relationship and response 
to being thus positioned. Reflexive fieldnotes, which included reflection on my 
identity, and affective responses, were made after each interview and during the 
process of analysis. These notes formed part of a reflective log (appendix J) and 
contributed material for reflective discussions with supervisors and colleagues. 
2.4.2. Epistemological Reflexivity 
Epistemological relativism has been critiqued on the basis of value neutrality and 
impotence to bring about social change. An extreme relativist position has 
relativistic consequences insofar as it claims that different social forces lead to 
the construction of a multiplicity of different realities, with no construction of reality 
having any claim to be more valid than another (Parker, 1998). As such, entirely 
relativistic truth claims have the potential to paralyse social activity at best, and at 
worst, to sabotage principled resistance to abuse of power and oppressive 
practice within a discipline (Burman, 1990). However, this study uncoupled 






realist ontology, and assuming judgmental rationality. This allowed for the 
theorisation of a subject with agency, a subject who is embodied and shaped by 
the social world, but capable of reflection and choice (Elder-vass, 2012). It has 
been posited that, as a discursive perspective draws attention to the flexible 
nature of personal and social being, it is a means of social critique and social 
change (Willig, 1999). Given the assumption of multiple competing social realities 
by epistemological relativism, the main concern is how to respond to this 
epistemological relativity (Willig, 1998). In direct contradiction to the notion of 
value neutrality, Willig (1998) suggests that researchers be informed by their 
political views in their choice of what to study, as the researcher who is interested 
in the workings of discourse must rely on their political views to choose which 
objects to deconstruct and which alternative constructions to suggest in their 
place. As the analysis in this study proceeded from more data-driven coding to 
more researcher-derived coding, a coding influenced by discursive theory, 
reflection by the researcher on political views, hypothesised to influence analytic 
choices, became a relevant consideration, explored in the reflective log and 
discussed in supervision.  
2.5. Evaluation Criteria 
The means of evaluating quality in qualitative research is an ongoing debate. The 
assumption of multiple competing social realities, as opposed to one objective 
reality, means that the criterion of validity needs to be re-conceptualised, with 
reflexivity foregrounded in order to provide information on the context of the 
production of meaning by the researcher (Lather, 1993). Continuous reflection by 
the researcher is considered an important aspect of the process of qualitative 
research (Harper, 2006). Reflexivity was an ongoing process throughout this 
project to trace my influence on meaning-making, and will be further elaborated 
on in chapter 4. In light of the relativist interpretations made in this study, the 
question of rigour was particularly pertinent to making the case that the 
interpretations, and the insights that stemmed from them, were more than simply 
arbitrary (Chamberlain, 2015). Spencer and Richie (2011) suggest that evaluation 
of qualitative research should be done according to the principles contribution, 
credibility and rigour. These principles will structure the evaluation of the quality 






3. CHAPTER THREE: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THEMES 
In this chapter, the analysis of the interview data is presented, organised into 
themes. The analysis focused on the examination of discursive resources drawn 
on, the subject positions they made available and implications for ways of being 
clinical psychologists, and a consideration of power. Data extracts are used to 
support and illustrate analytic interpretations. 
Figure 1: Table of themes:  
Themes Psychologist’s 
distress is 
constructed as part 











Subthemes Distress as a normal 
human response 
Distress as inherent 
to the role of the 
clinical psychologist 
 
Distress in the context of 
supervision 
 
 Psychologists are 
expected to be 
superhuman 
Training as a 
context for the 
socialisation of ways 




Managing distress in the 
team context 
 
3.1. Psychologist’s Distress is Constructed as Part of the Human Condition 
Participants mobilised a range of discourses to construct a social reality in which 
there is a group of humanity, of which psychologists are part, and a continuum of 
distress, which any human being can experience in difficult circumstances. 
Discourses constructing distress as part of the human condition were mobilised in 
resistance to discourses producing distress as a pathological or marginal 
experience, taboo for ‘experts’ who are expected to be immune to distress and 
able to exert a superior control over distress experience. 
3.1.1. Distress as a Normal Human Response 
Being human was constructed by participants to mean inevitably experiencing 
distress, with distress described by all participants as a given for human beings. 






of a developmental process of life. Michelle described the experience of distress 
in life as “a very healthy normal process”. These discursive resources produced 
distress as a natural human experience that does not necessarily indicate a need 
for professional intervention. Bereavement and loss (unavoidable experiences in 
the human life) were given by most participants as examples of life experiences 
expected to provoke distress for human beings, reinforcing the notion of a 
universality to the experience of distress. All participants explicitly positioned 
psychologists (including themselves) as members of the human race, for whom 
distress in life is inevitable, for example, Sophie stated:  
We are all human, we’re all gonna experience distress 
This discourse of distress as an aspect of the human condition was reminiscent 
of a Humanist discourse, as it appealed for recognition of a universal, natural, 
human experience (Copson, 2015); and also, of the evolutionary discourse that 
operates in Third-wave CBT approaches (as reviewed in ch.1.) to produce 
distress as a universal human experience. Three participants explicitly stated that 
training in CFT offered validation for a (described as pre-existing) view that we 
are all humans who all experience distress. The construction of distress as a non-
pathological human experience was also achieved by participants through the 
mobilisation of a sociogenic discourse that produced distress experienced by 
human beings as a response to difficult experience in the external world. A 
sociogenic discourse operated in participant’s talk about NHS staff distress to 
produce the NHS work context as a causal factor for a collective experience of 
distress. Michelle, among others, explicitly stated a causal connection between 
the NHS work context and NHS worker’s experiences of distress:  
a lot of NHS employees are distressed because, because of the working 
environment 
Two participants referred to whole staff teams who are “burnt out” in some 
services. While the concept of burnout can operate to individualise distress, by 
locating the distress in the individual worker, participants concurrently resisted 
the individualising effects of the concept by presenting these types of experience 






was described by three participants as a state of being “overwhelmed”, talk that 
evokes notions of experience that is too much for a person to bear.  
The positioning of themselves as ‘human’ was also achieved by a number of 
participants through descriptions of their own distress as experience felt in the 
body, and by all participants through the use of lay language to describe their 
own distress. While this discourse constructed distress in various ways, there 
was a consensus in using the word distress to refer to a broad spectrum of 
unpleasant human emotional experience. Participants used metaphors that 
constructed distress as a messy or dirty feeling: “a bout of feeling pretty shit” 
(Sarah), “feeling a little bit rubbish” (Rebecca); discourse that invited the 
positioning as victim of something bad or unpleasant: “suffering” (Rachel); and 
metaphors that indicated depth and fear of falling: “low days” (Louise), “that 
terrifying staring into an abyss feeling” (Anna). As illustrated by these 
descriptions, distress experience was represented by participants as occurring 
along a continuum of intensity. Sarah explicitly minimised the relevance of the 
professional identity in talk about psychologists experiencing distress: 
Yeah, I think it’s, you know, it’s what human beings experience, that, in my 
mind, I don’t think there’s a difference. I think if you are having, if you are 
in psychological distress, it doesn’t matter whether you’re a psychologist, 
or, or whatever, I think. When things are hard, things are hard.  
In the above extract, Sarah would appear to be resisting an implicit discourse that 
differentiates psychologists from other human beings on the basis of 
susceptibility to distress experience. It has been suggested that a dichotomous 
way of thinking about professionals and the recipients of their services is 
pervasive throughout the mental health services (Richards, 2010), and four 
participants explicitly described the dichotomisation of mental health 
professionals and people who use their services as ubiquitous within the mental 
health service. Sophie, Louise, and Michelle in talk about a process they called 
“othering”. Rebecca in talk about ‘us-and-them’ thinking that presented these as 
dichotomising notions as institutional features of longstanding: 
there are very strong us-and-them narratives which are very deep-seated 






It has been suggested that professional caring that entails the construction of 
distress as pathology supports a dichotomisation of mental health professionals 
and service users by positioning the recipient of care as ‘other’ (Johnstone, 2000; 
Laurance, 2003). Sophie made this link by describing processes of “othering” as 
occurring through the use of diagnostic terms by staff, to refer to clients, in 
“casual conversation”. This language presented the pathologising of distress as 
unremarkable, an accepted norm within the social context. Paula’s description of 
the mental health services as “pathologising of life” also presented the 
pathologising of distress as endemic, and concurrently called into question the 
marginality of distress experience, through the substitution of the word life for a 
word denoting distress. A number of participants disclaimed psychology’s role in 
the construction of distress as pathology, suggesting that psychologists use 
psychological theory in an attempt to counter the pathologising of distress. For 
example, Rachel, in talk about her role within a team: 
I suppose we're striving to promote psychological theories and ideas, em, 
to non-psychological staff, so having a, helping everyone to have a good 
understanding of distress from a sort of non-pathologising position.  
As Rachel was speaking about work with a hospital team, we might infer that it 
was the medical discourse she was implicating in the production of distress as 
pathology. However, this splitting of medical and psychological discourses, with 
the association of the production of distress as pathology with medical discourse 
alone, was not a consensus. Paula described the pathologising of distress within 
the mental health system as a process that clinicians, including herself, cannot 
avoid being party to, by virtue of the nature of the treatments on offer: 
you are inherently within kind of a system that is, that does pathologise 
people's, people's distress in a way. I think it, it, kind of sometimes locates 
it in the individual, and it’s, I think we almost have to, almost in a way, do 
that in order to be able to offer the, the interventions that we have on offer.  
She went on to describe the recognition of commonalities in affective experience 
with clients as creating an openness to a risk for psychologists that they will view 
their own distress as pathological:  






others I have some of these within myself. 
Paula’s talk is suggestive of dichotomisation of psychologists, who do the 
pathologising, and recipients of their services, whose affective experience is 
pathologised, and implied that the recognition of experience that challenges this 
binary can be disturbing for the psychologist, a notion also reflected in the talk of 
a number of other participants. Notably, her talk located the pathology inside the 
individual, implicating the previously referenced individualising models of distress, 
operating in the self-to-self relating of the psychologist to produce distress as 
pathological. Participants occasionally mobilised a medical discourse to describe 
past experience of distress. Sarah mentioned having a phobia, Sophie referred to 
having panic attacks, Michelle and Anna described themselves as having been 
depressed. However, standard professional intervention to treat distress, the 
social practice this discourse commonly dictates, was not referenced as sought 
out. Anna was in an ongoing process of Psychoanalysis but did not frame this as 
an intervention that treated her distress, stating that she did not know why her 
distress had resolved. 
3.1.2. Clinical Psychologists are Expected to be Superhuman  
Participants described being positioned by others, and also positioning 
themselves at times, as people expected to be less susceptible to distress than 
other human beings. Two participants used the word “immune” to describe the 
expectations that others have of the clinical psychologist’s susceptibility to 
distress. This term is suggestive of a medical discourse that constructs distress 
as illness or disease and a positioning of the psychologist as akin to medical 
expert, a positioning often juxtaposed in a binary relation with the patient position 
in medical discourse. In the following account, the positioning of the psychologist 
as ostensibly superior, “superhuman”, is presented by Michelle as, paradoxically, 
disempowering by virtue of the assumptions of invulnerability and the social 
practices (or rather exclusion from supportive social practices) this positioning 
entails: 
There’s this assumption that you’re a psychologist, you'll be sorted, like 
you won't need any extra help or support because, yeah, I don't even 






to the same, I don't know, to emotions, or kind of em [laughs] to being 
upset by things, or to needing extra support when things are tough 
A number of participants described the expectation that psychologists should 
have a superior ability to manage distress, without recourse to help from others, 
as linked to assumed knowledge. This association evokes Foucault’s (1975/1977, 
1980) coupling of the terms knowledge-power in his theorisation of the 
disciplinary power of the expert in modernity. Two participants described (but 
concurrently resisted) a notion of distress as controllable in constructing distress 
as “shit”, implying a messy bodily process that the psychologist should be able to 
control and keep private. The notions of control and processing in Louise’s talk of 
distress management evoked a technical or mechanistic process: 
you should have your own shit under control, em, that it should all be 
processed, sorted, neatly boxed off, kind of you know you should know 
how to cope with, life, I guess.  
As reviewed in chapter one, the Stoic notions underpinning the CBT model 
operate on the premise that emotion can be understood through the application 
of technical knowledge and controlled, by rational means, once one has the 
required knowledge. Both Sarah and Paula described assumptions of superior 
knowledge-power as made in personal as well as professional contexts. Paula’s 
talk called into question the notion of a separation between personal and 
professional identities for psychologists in the minds of others, including her 
family:  
I think even sometimes my parents have said oh you are a psychologist 
you should know, know better [laughs] 
The laughter accompanying the statement made by Paula (and Michelle in the 
first extract) could be interpreted as performed resistance to the notion of 
invulnerability to distress in the form of an invitation to the researcher to join in 
viewing this notion as comical. However, there was a suggestion that a dismissal 
of this expectation of reduced vulnerability to distress is not necessarily easily 
achieved by psychologists. Anna constructed her experience of distress in talk 
that presented the professional identity as intertwined with personal identity, with 






personal identities, and a feeling of shame described as accompanying the 
experience, and constraining talk to others about her distress: 
Actually, I lost all will to tell anyone anything, and I was also so, so caught 
up with so much shame around how I felt like I'd messed everything up 
and em been a bad psychologist, bad mother, bad wife, everything, that I 
really didn’t, I just couldn't face telling anyone.  
Rebecca’s talk also implied a construction of distress as shameful experience 
operated in the social context. She presented a fear of being viewed negatively 
by others as a powerful constraint on talk of personal distress by the 
psychologist: 
I think people are shut up, we don't talk about certain things because we 
don't want to be shamed by others, and I think that plays out in lots of 
settings or seen negatively in the eyes of others or in the mind of others, or 
feel we are being 
Wetherell (2013) argues that emotion is bound up with local moral orders, and 
according to Dalal (2018), “Metaphorically speaking, shame is the mechanism 
which entices us back towards and into ruling norms.” Talk of feeling shame, and 
fear of being shamed by others as constraining talk of personal distress by 
psychologists, constructed the experience of distress as the transgression of a 
social norm for psychologists. Deviance from a social norm has been linked to 
processes of stigmatisation (Helmus, Schaars, Wierenga et al., 2019), and four 
participants referred to distress as experience that is “stigmatised” for the 
psychologist. Paula described psychologists as prone to stigmatising themselves, 
indicating that similar normative processes operate in the psychologist’s self-to-
self relating. Louise’s talk constructed the profession of Clinical Psychology as 
one with a normative prohibition against members experiencing distress deeply 
embedded:  
I think it just feels ingrained in the profession that somehow you are not 
supposed to, you know that that’s only, that’s not what somebody might 
experience 






attachments and people who are not able to cope and/or do not have secure 
attachments, with psychologists positioned as people expected to be in the 
former group:  
We feel like we shouldn't be like this, and we should be, you know, better 
able to cope with it or be people with secure attachments, you know  
Robbins (2015) has pointed out that binary thinking not only creates boundaries 
between people but posits that one group are inherently superior to the other, 
and, “For classes of things to be true binary opposites, they must be mutually 
exclusive.” (p1). Michelle’s talk about what may happen if a psychologist acts in 
ways that would appear to challenge a binary between psychologists and their 
clients, communicating loudly about needs that are unmet due to systemic issues 
(implying distress or difficulties coping), evoked Foucault’s (1982) theory of the 
regulation of individual conduct through dividing practices. Foucault (1982) 
posited that through these normative practices the subject is divided within 
himself (sic), i.e. mind/body, or divided from others, i.e. sane/insane: 
And actually, that irony I suppose is that I think as a psychologist if you do 
start to shout about it it's then that kind of, you know, what’s the matter 
with them kind of, that’s seen as quite, em, worrying probably, or quite 
dangerous, or em meaning you’re not fit for your job or that you need time 
out. 
Foucault (1976/1980) proposed that confessional practices, i.e. practices 
entailing the ‘confession’ of personal experience, are also implicated in the 
regulation of individual conduct, as rituals for the production of ‘truth’ about the 
self. Both Sophie and Sarah used the word “admit” to describe talking to others 
about struggles to cope, constructing this talk as a confession of prohibited 
experience. Sarah linked this prohibition to the positioning of the psychologists as 
‘expert’: 
I think if you work in mental health services, as a, you know, kind of 
positioned as an expert in mental health kind of interventions, you know I 
think it can be difficult to, to admit, and I use that word consciously, eh, to 






However, practices of speaking about the self, to trusted others, have also been 
conceptualised as ‘technologies of the self’, a means of acquiring a self-
knowledge proposed to be central to taking care of the self (Foucault,1988). 
Seven participants reported that they had engaged in some form of talking 
therapy at some point during their career. Louise constructed psychotherapy as 
means of acquiring self-knowledge. However, her talk also implied a split 
between self-knowledge and a need for care. She presented psychotherapy as a 
practice that could be justified in the professional context as a self-knowledge 
project, but not as an acknowledgement of susceptibility to distress, or a form of 
help-seeking, as such: 
I just, you know, just wanted to know myself more, em, and that, that was 
true but almost noticing I needed to justify it as you know it's not that I'm 
like, I don't know, unwell, or it's not that I'm kind of struggling really 
Sophie referenced a discourse of experts-by-experience, discourse that seeks to 
disrupt a dichotomisation of psychologists and service users, by constructing 
personal experience of distress as valuable within the mental health services. 
However, she problematised this discourse as one paradoxical in its effects in 
practice, as it can be mobilised in a professional context to support and 
perpetuate division and categorisation:  
almost all of those conversations still kind of assume there's, therefore, a 
difference, that kind of there’s still an us and them in that of well there’s 
experts by experience, and there’s experts by whatever the other one is, 
and there’s kind of somehow still something different about clinical 
psychologists who've experienced mental health distress and clinical 
psychologists who haven't, and I suppose for me that still feels not that 
helpful, of there just shouldn't be any kind of distinction 
As indicated in the extract to follow, it was suggested by a number of participants 
that talk about a continuum of distress experiences by psychologists is what is 






constructed the prohibition against speaking about distress as a systemic issue in 
her use of the metaphor of the #Metoo movement9: 
We know it’s not possible for people to go through life and not have 
(laugh) some sort of crisis of some description, so where are those, where 
are those experiences, where are people talking about them, you know. 
So, I guess that’s, that’s somewhere to start, is that, a kind of, you know, 
psychological distress me too kind of campaign  
The use of this metaphor constructed the action required as political or politicised 
action, based in solidarity, opening up an activist position for psychologists who 
speak about personal distress. Clare juxtaposed a psychologist’s self-
management of emotion (an expectation she validated to some degree) and talk 
about distress as political action, also inviting the activist subject position for the 
psychologist who speaks about distress as a systemic issue: 
I think we have a role to try and manage our own emotions as much as we 
can, but we also have a much bigger political role in saying the way that 
services are set up is shite (laughs)  
3.2. Work with Distress as a Difficult and Skilled Practice 
Experience of distress by the clinical psychologist in the context of clinical work 
was also normalised by participants, and, although framed as difficult experience, 
not negatively connoted, but used to make a case for emotional support for 
psychologists in performing their role, access to which they presented as 
constrained by systemic priorities and dominant discourses. Participants 
positioned themselves as advocates for the normalisation of distress experience, 
with a view to increasing access to relational support for psychologists, both in 
training and in qualified practice. 
                                                             
9 The #Metoo movement is a social movement against sexual abuse and sexual harassment 
– whereby, women have spoken publicly about their experiences of abuse by men in more 
powerful social positions. Its main aim is to break the silence about these experiences, and 
empower women through solidarity to challenge the power imbalances that support sexism 






3.2.1. Distress as Inherent to the Work of the Clinical Psychologist 
Both Rebecca and Louise used the word “inherent” to describe the relationship 
between distress and clinical work, language that constructs distress as a 
permanent, or essential, characteristic of clinical work. There was a consensus in 
constructing the work with others experiencing distress as demanding and 
potentially distressing for the psychologist. This was explicitly stated by 
participants and also achieved in talk that presented a picture of the clinical work 
as entailing contact with the distressing lived experience of other people. Sophie 
used the term “vicarious traumatisation” to describe the effect of the clinical work 
on psychologists over time, a concept that produced contact with client distress 
as causative of psychologist distress. Similarly, Michelle’s use of the word 
“exposed” constructed psychologists as vulnerable to harm from the distress of 
others:  
you are exposed to so much, kind of distress and trauma on a day-to-day 
basis and how can that not impact on you, kind of, you know, that if it 
doesn't impact on you that almost in itself is a bit of a worry or a bit of a 
concern 
However, there was a consensus in constructing the exposure to distressing 
experience as an inevitable concomitant of good practice as a psychologist, as 
indicated in the above extract. Although there were slightly different accounts of 
this process, clinical practice was described as necessitating a sustained 
openness to emotional experience as the basis for the work of helping others with 
distress. Therapeutic work with clients was constructed by five participants using 
the psychoanalytic discourse of ‘containment’. This discourse produced the 
clinical work as a relational-affective process entailing the taking in of the client’s 
emotion, by the psychologist, in order to help the client to manage their emotional 
experience. Rebecca’s use of a feeding metaphor, and talk of developmental 
processes, evoked psychoanalytic theory’s maternal construction of the therapist 
subjectivity: 
The work we do is about trying to sit with people and somehow digest or 






sort of understandable way and start to sort of develop people's capacity 
to think. 
Psychoanalytic discourse produced the psychologist as both receptacle for 
distress, and expert manager and interpreter of distress, allowing participants to 
claim an epistemic authority. The power accorded to the clinical psychologist by 
this discourse could be described as a pastoral power, which has been defined 
as a power to tend to others through "knowledge of the conscience and an ability 
to direct it" (Foucault, 1982, p.783).  
Knowledge, as psychotherapeutic discourse, dictates how a psychologist should 
arrange their relationship with others as a condition for the social practices of 
professional caring, specifying appropriate subject positions for the psychologist 
and those they relate with in their role (Guilfoyle, 2005). The origins of the 
containment discourse is in the theorisation of the mother-infant relation by the 
psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion, theorised as a relation in which there is only one 
subject (the infant) and an object (the mother) who provides the function of 
containment for the infant (Bion, 1962). As such, this discourse invites an 
explicitly asymmetrical positioning, with the psychologist positioned as ‘expert-
container’, with primary responsibility for the control of emotional experience, and 
the client in the complementary ‘dependant-contained’ position, reliant on the 
psychologist for the management of their emotional experience. However, there 
was also some resistance to the ‘expert’ position that a container-contained 
discourse invites. Anna’s talk implied a problematisation of the ‘expert’ position, 
and she made a case for the value of personal psychotherapy as a process that 
provides lived experience of distress that challenges a positioning of the 
psychologist as inherently different to the client: 
…having experienced being a patient, or really struggling, which I think is, 
is uniquely important […] maybe it gives you some humility and some 
appreciation of the depths people can experience and, and stops you 
positioning yourself as an expert. 
Furthermore, a number of participants made a case for a human-to-human 
relating in clinical practice, as a form of relating required for feelings of empathy 






constrained by dichotomising notions. In human-to-human relating, also called ‘I-
Thou’ relating (Buber,1958), the person being related to is recognised to be as 
fully human as ourselves, in contrast to a de-humanising form of relating enabled 
by othering processes (Buber, 1958). Paula constructed feelings of empathy as 
based in acknowledgement of a shared humanity: 
I mean, I think it’s just personally it’s just helpful not to hold kind of a 
polarised attitude of there’s this world where there are the people that 
struggle and the people who don't. Yeah. Just because I think that, that 
makes our, that would make our job really hard. It would make it actually 
very hard to empathise and sympathise.  
The psychoanalytic concepts of transference and countertransference were 
mobilised by five participants to produce the psychologist’s own emotional 
experience as useful to the therapeutic process, while also need to be controlled 
by the psychologist in interaction, as illustrated in Michelle’s talk about clinical 
practice: 
I think you have to be able to use, like with, you know, transference and 
countertransference, and being present and using what you are feeling, 
but equally not allow that to maybe dominate the room or kind of, em, turn 
it into all about you and your feeling on it  
The balance of managing one’s own emotion, while still having access to it, was 
described by Michelle as the psychologist keeping their own emotion in a box 
“but not a locked box”, constructing personal emotional experience as something 
that must be boundaried, contained within an internal space by the psychologist, 
but kept accessible. Five participants also mobilised a containment discourse to 
describe their supportive function as supervisors, and three to describe their 
emotion management function in teams. In talk about providing a containment 
function for staff teams, Rachel used the metaphor of a box to construct 
management of emotional experience as a boundarying of emotion, similarly 
differentiating this process from suppression of emotional experience entirely: 
I talk about containing so physically like a box shape, so kind of em 
helping things to be a manageable size so they don't feel too big, but 






that, that then can help the person or the people who you're relating to, to 
feel that it's manageable 
There was a consensus in constructing the internal space for holding emotion as 
one with limited capacity, and this notion was used to make a case for access to 
institutionally-legitimised space for emotion to be released by the psychologist. 
Participant’s talk indicated adverse consequences both personally and 
professionally for the psychologist who does not have access to a legitimised 
space at work to release this emotion. Paula constructed emotion held internally 
as a liquid that can “stagnate” inside you if not released, talk that constructs 
holding emotion inside for too long as unhealthy for the psychologist. Clare stated 
that internally-held emotion continues to “build and build” and is carried home to 
affect home life if there is not a “proper outlet” at work. Louise’s talk implied a 
reduced capacity for clinical work in the absence of a space for the psychologist 
to release emotion held internally: 
there’s no space to take someone else’s feelings unless you clear out 
some of your own 
Four participants made a case for legitimised space for emotional support by 
mobilising a psychoanalytic discourse of anxiety-defence, common in 
psychoanalytic studies of emotion management in organisations (e.g., Menzies 
Lyth, 1959; Obholzer, & Roberts, 1994). This discourse produced dichotomising 
practice in clinical work as defensive emotion management practice, occuring in 
the absence of alternative ways for the clinician to manage the emotional 
demands of the role. Michelle’s talk about this defensive emotion management 
practice constructed emotion as dangerous, validating the notion of a clinician’s 
need to be protected: 
If the distress is very strong and it feels very, very dangerous can, it can 
probably, quickly result in either complete othering of the person that they 
are working with, as a way of protecting themselves against those feelings, 
or… 
Rebecca gave an account of disconnection from client emotional experience 
happening, as a non-volitional defence, in a service where she had limited 







just feeling unable to sit with or manage anybody else’s distress that I was 
working with, and actually very quickly in a very scary way actually I think 
becoming very, very, cut off and disconnected from the people I was 
working with 
Overall, participant’s constructions of their role and identity validated an 
openness to emotional experience and a need for emotional support in the role. 
However, there was a tension evident between these constructions and the way 
the service (and/or training course -to be discussed in a subsequent theme) was 
described as constructing the psychologist’s role and identity, in some 
institutional contexts. Rebecca metaphorically implied that an institutional 
construction of the psychologist’s identity can negate notions of the possibility of 
an affective response in the clinician, and construct their clinical role as a 
mechanistic or technical process: 
the idea that you should be able to just sit and do therapy like a robot, em, 
person after person after person, and not be affected, and not feel, and 
services that sort of perpetuate this narrative that, you know, this is just 
what we do and its, it's fine  
A number of participants linked the devaluing of space for emotion by the 
institution to a prioritisation of numerical indicators of success over care of people 
by the institution. Sophie described the emphasis on performance management 
as constraining the space for reflection that clinicians need: 
so what gets paid attention to are KPI's [key performance indicators] so 
that’s what everyone pays attention to, and reflective space will get 
pushed right down the agenda, and that space that we need to think gets 
pushed down 
The prioritisation of activity over reflection in particular service contexts was 
constructed by Rebecca and Anna as defensive systemic practice, using 
discourse evocative of Menzies Lyth’s (1988) notion of systemic defences against 
intolerable emotion, a psychoanalytic discourse that produced the constant 






defending against intolerable emotion, by shutting down spaces for contact with 
emotional experience. Rebecca’s construction of her distress in this context as 
feeling “uncontained” evokes notions of a systemic failure to meet caregiving 
responsibilities toward clinicians: 
thinking about services where I felt uncontained actually they’ve been 
where the distress has been really high, and the system has sort of 
perpetuated this inability to think, so this idea that we need to be seeing 
people back-to-back to back, we need to, we can’t be having enough like, 
supervision is very limited, or it doesn’t happen and almost like to be able 
to sit and think with and tolerate the distress is so unbearable, so the day 
just gets jam-packed  
Seven participants spoke of increasing power, with increasing seniority, to 
influence systemic practices. They spoke of involvement in strategic service 
planning, staff supervision and training of staff teams. However, Anna positioned 
herself as protector of relational reflective spaces, talk that presented a picture of 
these spaces as under threat: 
...slotting in and protecting these actual spaces like a reflective practice 
group or like clinical supervision. 
Paula described making time for reflective practice groups as “harder to justify” in 
qualified practice, talk that presented these practices as a low priority and implied 
that the decisional authority was located elsewhere. She went on to emphasise 
the hierarchal nature of the system, positioning clinicians as dependant on 
“management” for their decision-making power within the system. 
While supportive practices were in the main constructed as relational practices, 
five participants did mention self-care. They primarily constructed self-care, in lay 
language, as taking breaks during the workday, and establishing boundaries 
between personal and professional life, to allow time for things other than work. 
Sophie spoke of “putting boundaries around your work”, constructing work as 
something that must be fenced in/kept in its place in order to care for the self. 
However, this establishment and maintenance of boundaries, including taking 
breaks, was presented by a number of participants as an aspirational goal, rather 






Furthermore, three participants described an increasing systemic pressure to 
work longer hours with increasing seniority.  
3.2.2. Training as a Context for the Socialisation of Ways of Being with Emotional 
Experience 
There was a consensus in constructing the training context as one of high 
demand, and distress experienced by trainees as inevitable to some degree, but 
a lack of consensus on whether training socialises trainees to manage distress 
and demands in a helpful way. This lack of consensus may reflect diversity in 
training practices, and overall ethos, between the various training courses. Some 
participants described trainee distress as amplified by a training context of high 
demand coupled with low support in practice (some suggested the support 
existed on paper), a context that negates messages about the importance of self-
care practice that requires time away from work. Four participants suggested that 
a strategy of pushing through and ignoring distress is the strategy socialised pre-
training, reinforced during training, and continued into qualified practice. Rachel, 
who experienced a physical health crisis post-qualification, described distress 
throughout training as an embodied experience that she only saw as problematic 
in retrospect: 
a simmering level of, you know simmering background kind of noise of 
distress, that em, I just accepted and felt was acceptable  
She used a discourse of judicial punishment, or devotional suffering, to position 
the psychologist as consistently relatively powerless within the system, fortunate 
if reasonable expectations are set by others: 
You flog yourself to get onto the course, and then you flog yourself 
throughout the course, and then you might end up in a job where you, 
there’s an expectation that you will flog yourselves  
Rachel’s talk constructed inattention to experience of distress and pushing 
oneself to perform as an accepted norm for the trainee. Sarah described this 
norm as produced by a longstanding socialisation practice for work in the NHS, 
authorised by those in power, a category she positioned herself in, in reference 






I used to think it kind of set you up to manage the eh, in terms of stamina 
wise, to manage the pressures of the NHS, and then I was like, well, like, 
is that even ok? I mean why are we doing that, you know, that shouldn't be 
ok either, you know actually, em, you know kind of we are therapying 
people to be kind of overworked (laugh) and unsupported [...] you know it’s 
not ok, because then we are perpetuating something in that system and 
we are, something is permissible 
Sarah’s description of the socialisation process as “therapying” invites a 
construction of the training process as an expert intervention, positioning the 
trainee in the (less powerful) client position in relation to the training course. The 
majority of participants constructed the relationship between training courses and 
trainees as hierarchical but dynamic, with trainees entering the course with pre-
socialised ways of being in relation to their own emotional experience, usually 
through work within the health service, and courses responsible for either 
reinforcing or challenging this way of being in training practices. Six participants 
suggested that courses actively recruit people who have developed a strategy of 
not attending to or not showing distress to perform in such a way as to secure a 
training place. Rachel echoed Rebecca’s use of the metaphor of the robot, a 
metaphor that implied a construction of the clinical psychologist’s role as 
technical or mechanistic and, in this instance, implied an absence of emotionality 
was the ideal for recruiters: 
...they were trying to seek people who maybe were a bit more like robots, 
it felt. 
Louise suggested that the experience of personal distress was not constructed as 
an expected aspect of the clinical psychologist’s role in the training context:  
I think that as a whole, training courses are not set up to acknowledge that 
distress is a part of what we might experience when we hear everybody 
else's distress all day, every day. 
Michelle differentiated between the performance of managed emotional 
experience by the psychologist, which she described as socialised during 






I guess part of training is probably how you, you know, how to do the swan 
thing of sitting with a client appearing very calm, whilst inwardly paddling 
furiously and thinking oh my god, what am I doing, or what shall I do about 
this, or that’s really hard to hear or, you know. 
Michelle’s use of the metaphor of the swan suggested that there is an 
expectation that psychologists will appear serene and keep their emotional 
experience under the surface. A number of participants talked of receiving both 
explicit and implicit messages from the course that expression of distress was not 
expected or acceptable by psychologists in the training context. 
Three participants linked the recruitment of trainees with a particular way of being 
in relation to distress, and the failure of training courses to offer trainees 
adequate support to manage the emotional impact of the work, to a discourse 
that constructs resilience as an internal quality of the individual, indicated by the 
absence of an emotional response to adversity. There was a consensus that an 
alternative form of resilience, one based in an awareness of emotional 
experience and the capacity to talk about this experience to others, is what 
training courses should be trying to foster, as this is what is required to sustain 
clinical psychologists in qualified practice. This was referred to as “a flexible 
resilience” by Michelle and contrasted with a stoic form of resilience that she 
constructed as something fragile, “brittle resilience”, that would be shattered by 
distressing experience in practice over time. Participants suggested that this 
alternative form of resilience could be developed through access to 
psychotherapy and the provision of relational spaces on training that allow 
trainees to express vulnerability.  
Participants constructed access to relational reflective spaces on training as a 
valuable aspect of professional development in two key ways. Firstly, as these 
spaces encourage trainees to connect to their internal experience, to allow for the 
development of a level of comfort with personal vulnerability, which they 
presented as conducive to improved self-care. Four participants, who stated that 
they did not have access to helpful reflective spaces during training, described 
personal therapy they engaged in after completing training as a space for the 






their own emotional experience. A process they felt they should have been able 
to undertake on training. Secondly, these spaces, particularly reflective practice 
groups, were constructed as valuable in developing a professional subjectivity 
that allows talk about personal emotional experience to others, facilitating a form 
of resilience located in relationships that allow the expression of vulnerability. The 
alternative form of resilience constructed by participants evoked the notion of 
relational resilience (Jordan, 2004), conceptualised as a resilience built through 
growth-fostering relationships that depart from the construction of relationships in 
terms of binary oppositions and separateness, with the denial of vulnerability and 
illusory self-sufficiency this entails. Reinforcing the notion of a resilience 
embedded in relationships as valuable, all participants referred to friendships with 
psychologists they had trained with as an important source of informal support 
post-qualification. Two participants described reflective spaces they experienced 
on training as supportive in developing an awareness of personal vulnerability 
and allowing the development of capacity for a resilience embedded in 
relationships once qualified. However, Paula also presented the reflective 
practice group as an experience she did not feel positively inclined towards at the 
time: 
As much as I hated going there [reflective practice group], I think there 
was this real recognition that it was a course that was trying to offer 
something for you in the way of time to think, reflect, develop personally, 
and that gave the very clear message that you, you can maybe talk about 
things that are difficult and I think that those kind of things are also really 
helpful when you are working as a qualified psychologist. 
A number of participants described trainees as resistant to talking about their 
emotional experience in groups, as a practice perceived as dangerous. For 
example, Michelle’s talk emphasised notions of risk: 
I think that's very threatening and there is always trainees who really, 
really don't want to do that, that does not feel like a very safe thing to do at 
all 
Louise proposed that reflective spaces require a different type of subjectivity, one 






to develop in a consistent staged process: 
It’s almost like you have to work down that hierarchy, maybe you have to 
start with thinking about someone else, and then you can think about the 
environment, and then you can think about where you sit in that 
environment, and maybe that’s about unpicking that kind of strategy of 
self-reliance stage by stage. But that I think, for a lot of trainees, that’s 
been quite hard, so being able to own it, and yet if you don't have it from 
day one of a course that that’s what we do here, I think it’s, you can't just 
introduce a reflective practice group at some point and expect people to be 
able to sit comfortably with their own feelings. I think it needs to be out 
there, but it’s difficult.  
This talk presented the reflective practice group as a space in which counter-
conducts can be developed, i.e. performances that disrupt hegemonic norms 
(Foucault 1981/2000). In this case, norms that support a denial of personal 
vulnerability and encourage self-reliance. However, Louise emphasised the 
discomfort of this process for the trainee and positioned the course as more 
powerful, responsible for explicitly setting alternative social norms in a more 
directive way.  
3.3. Negotiating Dilemmas of Professional Identity and Role 
Negotiating professional identity and role in professional relational contexts was 
presented as dilemmatic for clinical psychologists, as discourses that operate in 
these contexts to produce role and identity invite subject positions that embody 
conflicting or contradictory affective and social practices. Thus, the performance 
and combining of the subjectivities available to clinical psychologists was 
presented as a complicated process. Talk about experience of distress by the 
psychologist was presented as a relational risk, amplified in the supervisory 
context by the construction of supervision as surveillance, and in the team 
context by the expectations attending seniority within a team. 
3.3.1. Distress in the Context of Supervision 
There was a consensus that supervision that allows talk of struggle and 






psychologist in their work and can sustain the psychologist in a challenging role, 
but also that this form of supervision is not reliably available to all psychologists. 
Supervision was constructed as serving a surveillance function (that may or may 
not be benign) by all participants at some point, perhaps unsurprisingly given that 
this is the primary function accorded to supervision in policy documents. Safety 
was a frequently referenced concept in talk about supervision, and there was a 
consensus in describing the nature of the relationship as a key factor determining 
the extent to which it is safe for a supervisee to speak about their emotional 
experience. In addition to using the word relationship to describe supervision, a 
number of participants mobilised discourse that emphasised the relational-
affective aspects of supervision. For example, Louise referred to the supervisory 
relationship as a “secure attachment” and Sarah as a “secure base”, concepts 
that also evoke notions of security vs insecurity in asymmetrical relationships. 
Three participants emphasised the importance of human responses indicating 
care for them, as a person, from their supervisor as the basis for their feeling of 
safety in the relationship. Sophie was exceptional in her use of a lay discourse to 
construct supervision as a human-to-human relationship, and she constructed the 
supervisory relationship as a space in which expression of strong emotion was 
safe. She constructed her distress as a normal human vulnerability, positioning 
herself as having similar needs to a client in terms of responses to her distress: 
Yeah, yeah, that you trust that you can be vulnerable in front of em, and I 
think that’s, that is the biggest thing I think, I would say, in my experience, 
is that there is someone that you can go and who will say, you know, let’s 
make a cup of tea, let’s sit down, let’s talk about it. I mean, it’s not rocket 
science because it’s what we know, if we speak to the people who use our 
services, they all say, look I, what I really want is someone I can sit down 
and talk to and trust, we’re not different, we’re not different.  
Sophie’s talk presented resistance to dichotomising notions as facilitative of less 
restricted emoting practice for the supervisee. Rebecca constructed the 
supervisor who is unsafe to speak to about personal emotional experience as 
someone who is inclined to practice based in dichotomising notions:  







Similarly, Paula constructed an unsafe supervisory space as one in which an 
admission of “struggling” would be unsafe, likely to invite a judgemental type of 
surveillance by the supervisor. Clare referred to the supervisor functioning as a 
“safety net”, and Sarah spoke of the supervisor being able to “catch anything I 
didn’t notice” with regards to personal experience of distress. This discourse, 
producing distress as dangerous, and supervision as a form of risk management, 
evoked notions of surveillance and of distress as the potential for impairment. 
Both constructed the surveillance function as benign, supportive. However, Clare 
elsewhere referenced concerns about perceived fitness to practice as a reason 
that the psychologist may not talk openly about emotional experience, implying a 
dilemma entailed in the dual-construction of supervision as surveillance and 
support.  
Clare stated that supervision should not become “pseudo-therapy” and indicated, 
as did a number of other participants, that talk of personal and emotional 
experience by the supervisee dictates this boundary between supervision and 
therapy. However, the clear boundaries delineating personal therapy from 
supervision that the DCP propose should exist (DCP, 2014) were presented by 
participants as difficult to define in practice. Foucault (1982) theorised that the 
operation of power can be seen when an inspecting gaze is interiorised by the 
subject who then comes to exercise surveillance over themselves, becoming their 
own overseer and self-regulating in accordance with the demands of the social 
context. This self-regulation was presented as a process complicated for 
psychologists by a lack of clarity about the demands of the supervisory social 
context. Michelle spoke about trying to figure out, in her early years of practice as 
a psychologist, how much she was “allowed” to share about her emotional 
experience, constructing talk of emotional experience as something that may or 
may not be permitted. Rebecca constructed the supervisory relationship as a 
context in which the rules or norms are unclear (although she suggests 
otherwise): 
I think there are different ideas in terms of what’s appropriate for 






think there's, there is a very clear boundary as well between, you know, 
supervision and therapy and how you use both appropriately, em, and that 
it’s hard and I think there’s often a bit of a panic in terms of what’s ok to 
talk about, what’s not ok to talk about what will, I don't know.  
Her repetition of the word “appropriate” indicated a social norm, but one 
constructed as mercurial, and her description was suggestive of a nebulous 
threat should she fail to correctly judge a boundary between the practices of 
supervision and therapy. Two participants predominantly mobilised a container-
contained discourse to describe the supervision process. This discourse 
validated the expression of strong emotion in supervision, and allowed a 
positioning for the supervisee that entitled them to a supported vulnerability, and 
expert help to manage their emotional experience. Michelle’s talk produced 
access to supervision that can offer containment as dependant on a sense of 
safety in the supervisory relationship, and systemic priorities: 
obviously you have supervision and you kind of hope that’s a safe space in 
which to do that, but I know a lot of people who either don’t feel that safety 
with their supervisor or, you know, supervision gets cancelled or moved or 
other things are prioritised.  
Sophie was unusual in describing reliable access to an emotionally supportive 
supervisory relationship, even with an increase in seniority. Three participants 
described the emotionally-supportive supervisory space as harder to find with an 
increase in seniority. Louise indicated that there is less of an expectation (from 
self and others) that the psychologist will need this type of supervisory space as 
they move up the hierarchy and that the priorities of supervision can shift: 
the emotional bit probably has been missing from that because the, the 
focus has been strategic 
However, there was a consensus that with increasing seniority, the need for 
emotional support in the role does not decline. Two of the three participants who 
did not have access to supervision that allowed talk of emotional experience 
constructed personal therapy as an alternative relational space to freely express, 
and make sense of, their emotional experience. Louise framed the expectations 






expectation based in an association of seniority with a reduced emotional 
experience:  
…somehow because you are in that senior post, that you are not 
supposed to feel things anymore (laughs) 
Her laughter suggests a framing of this expectation as comical or ridiculous. 
3.3.2. Managing Distress in the Team Context 
Participants primarily used a lay language, for example, “chat” (Sophie), “rant” 
(Clare), “moan”, “grumbles” (Paula), to describe talk about emotion with 
colleagues in the MDT, language constructing conversations about emotion in the 
team context as more casual or informal human interactions. Four participants 
presented relationships with colleagues as spaces that offer space for a more 
‘human’ subjectivity in talk about having a laugh with colleagues and speaking 
about topics other than work. Clare referred to conversations about distressing 
experience, with colleagues, as happening over a cup of tea (as Sophie had in 
speaking about her supervision), strengthening the construction of these spaces 
as informal and the positioning of both parties as fellow-humans, rather than 
professionals, with reference to a more domestic setting: 
I think the types of places where you can have a bad session and then go 
and have a rant and a cup of tea with someone, for me that’s a much more 
supportive, and that’s I think how you do the more distressing work long-
term.  
As illustrated in the above extract, and in common with descriptions of the 
function of good supervision, relationships with team members that allowed talk 
of emotional experience were constructed as serving a sustenance function for 
the psychologist working in emotionally challenging contexts. Sarah referred to 
this as “a kind of team resilience situation”, discourse that produced resilience as 
a quality of a group rather than an individual. A number of participants 
constructed the MDT team as a supportive community, offering the psychologist 
a position of belonging, embeddedness, connectedness to others as a team 
member. For example Louise, who also mobilised a discourse of risk to 






The work that we do is very demanding, as you know, and really there is 
something about you can work in incredibly demanding settings but if, but 
if you feel supported, if you are not alone, if there is a sense of belonging 
and connection to your team members and you feel that they’ve got your 
back, and you’ve got someone to talk to and that you are not left alone 
with high-risk situations.  
Six participants juxtaposed practising alone, a practice produced as dangerous 
by a risk discourse, with having someone to go to after a distressing experience, 
someone to talk to and think with, someone who would offer validation of 
emotional experience and support. One participant (who did not work in an MDT 
context at the time of the study) problematised the ‘expert’ position, as one 
desired by others, but not conducive to the establishment of relationships for the 
one positioned as expert: 
…and really be part of the teams and embedded in them rather than a kind 
of roving expert who arouses a lot of envy or suspicion. 
With the use of profanity and lay language, and talk of fallibility, Rebecca 
emphasised a positioning of herself as ‘human’ in relationships with team 
members: 
em, what makes for good colleagues I think, people that, I think there’s 
something about having people that you’re working with where the 
relationship is sort of good enough that it's ok for it not to be ok, so if 
you’ve like really fucked something up, or you’ve had a really shit day, em, 
and you’ve done something awfully wrong, or just been a rubbish therapist 
that day 
Rachel also constructed access to these supportive team relationships as 
dependent on being able to perform a ‘human’ subjectivity but presented the 
revealing of human vulnerability by the clinician as a risk. Similarly, Louise 
described not talking about personal experience in teams as a defensive emotion 
management practice: 
…you know people have to keep themselves separate because that’s the 






The notion of talk about emotional experience as boundary work, and of norms 
as unclear or disputed, was reflected on by Sophie, who, like Rebecca, used the 
word “appropriate”, implying a risk of breaching social norms or rules: 
so to talk about your own distress in a work context, even though it might 
be work-related, I think some people would not feel was, wouldn’t be 
comfortable with, or wouldn't feel was appropriate, so I suppose it’s where 
do you put those markers between what you share and what you don’t 
share in a work context  
Sarah endorsed a construction of clinical psychologist as professional that 
requires the limitation of talk of the personal, presenting crossing a boundary 
between personal and professional as practice that may undermine her 
professional identity: 
I think there’s some kind of level of professional impression management, 
you know. I mean I have anyway, I, you know, It's, em, I just think it's you 
know, it’s just being professional really having a professional boundary.  
There was a suggestion that the pressure to distinguish oneself from other staff 
increased with seniority. Parker (1992) proposed that social structure provides 
the pre-condition for positioning in discourse, and two participants described a 
positioning as ‘container-expert’ linked to their seniority within teams. The 
container-contained dynamic has been critiqued on the basis that, as a theorised 
subject-object relation, it constrains the subjectivity of the container in the 
dynamic (in this case, the psychologist), thus constraining intersubjective relating 
(Benjamin, 1990). Two participants in particular described a positioning as 
‘container-expert’ as one that constrained their intersubjective relating in teams. 
The positioning as ‘container-expert’, responsible for the care of others, 
dominated Michelle’s descriptions of her relationships with the staff team. She 
also described the management of a demand for care from others, by setting 
boundaries, as complicated by a conflict with the values of her professional 
identity: 
yeah, of being able to assert some kind of boundary, and I guess trusting 
that that doesn’t mean that that makes you a crappy psychologist or that 






Michelle’s construction of her professional identity here evokes Foucault’s (1982) 
notion of pastorship as a salvation-based form of power grounded in the provision 
of love and it has been suggested that pastorship values commitment to those 
being cared for to the point of self-sacrifice (Hook, 2003). In line with this notion 
of self-sacrifice, a number of participants described not prioritising, or as Sophie 
framed it, “neglecting” (an antithetical notion to self-care), their own needs in 
order to meet the needs of others. As illustrated in the following extract, Rachel 
mobilised a discourse of distress as something that must be controlled and not 
shown by the psychologist, in order to offer the containment function in a 
multidisciplinary team:  
you might be the highest-paid person in that team, and you almost have to 
park your own distress at the door to manage the other professionals, em, 
you know so to be containing for others, to be seen as being able to cope 
and to manage, in order to keep other people afloat you know 
Her description evoked an image of risk and positioned her as responsible for 
providing safety for the team through a performance of coping that entails not 
showing her emotional experience. However, both Michelle and Rachel also 
struggled with this construction of psychologist as ‘container-expert’, who cannot 
show emotion, resisting it at times utilising a discourse of shared humanity and a 
Behaviourist discourse of modelling. Michelle spoke about a plan to try to perform 
a more ‘human’ subjectivity, to establish a different dynamic with the team in her 
next role (she was due to change jobs): 
actually, it’s an opportunity to model that it’s alright to have days where 
you're feeling sad or feeling stressed or feeling anxious that, kind of, its ok 
to talk about that, to acknowledge that  
In the above extract, Michelle uses the behavioural discourse of modelling to 
justify the expression of emotion, by the senior psychologist, by re-inscribing it as 







4. CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION AND CRITICAL REVIEW 
In this chapter the analytic findings are considered, in dialogue with relevant 
literature and empirical research, and situated in the historical and socio-cultural 
context of the Clinical Psychology profession in the UK. The questions of 
reflexivity and of the evaluation of the quality of the research are re-considered. 
Lastly, some implications of the findings for research and practice are presented.  
4.1. Discussion  
Broadly speaking, the picture presented by participants in this study was 
resonant with the conclusion drawn by previous authors that organisational and 
professional factors function to constrain clinical psychologists from 
acknowledging their own distress and accessing support (Hannigan et al., 2004; 
Walsh & Cormack, 1994). In talk about clinical psychologist’s experiences of 
distress, including their own, study participants emphasised the clinical 
psychologist’s humanity and minimised the relevance of the professional identity. 
However, they also constructed the experience of distress as inherently bound up 
with the clinical psychologist’s professional identity and role. Both constructions, 
clinical psychologist as ‘human’ and clinical psychologist as ‘container-expert’, 
were mobilised in the service of attempts to create space for acknowledgement of 
clinical psychologist’s experiences of distress and to make a case for supportive 
social practices for clinicians in the NHS. 
4.1.1. Research Questions Re-visited 
4.1.1.1. How do participants construct a clinical psychologist's experience of 
distress in relation to their professional identity? 
Participants in this study described distress as stigmatised for the clinical 
psychologist. They talked of feelings of shame linked to experiences of distress, 
and of fear of being viewed differently by colleagues as inhibiting the 
psychologist’s talk of personal distress. These findings are consistent with the 
conclusions drawn by previous researchers that stigma, and concerns about 
adverse consequences arising from talk about personal distress in a professional 
context, are implicated in constraining clinical psychologists from talking about 






2012; Grice et al, 2018; Tay et al., 2018). The construction of distress as 
stigmatised and shameful for the psychologist can be understood with reference 
to the socio-historical and discursive context of the construction of the clinical 
psychologist’s professional identity, and the perpetuation of particular 
representations of reality, and subjectivities, in the discourses and practices of 
the present context of the clinical psychologist in the NHS.  
Stigma, Dividing Practices, and Dichotomising Notions 
Foucault (1962/1987) opined that psychologists draw on qualified forms of 
science to give them the knowledge-power to engage normalisation practices. 
Rose (1998) proposed that these disciplinary practices also shape the subjectivity 
of members of the psy-professions. Norms are a key consideration in 
understanding stigma as stigmatisation can be described as a process in which a 
particular condition is judged by an individual or group to deviate from a norm, 
evoking negative emotional and behavioural responses toward those judged to 
be deviant (Helmus et al., 2019). Dividing practices entailing the classification, 
categorisation, and division of human beings function to construct norms 
(Foucault, 1961/1965,1982). The origins of Clinical Psychology in psychometric 
testing root the profession in classification practices that legitimise binaries 
(Hubbard & Hare, 2015). Diagnostic classification systems, produced by a 
medical discourse, are powerfully constitutive of pathology and normality and can 
be considered one of the primary means through which power operates in the 
past, and present, mental health service context (Pickersgill, 2012). A consistent 
finding of prior research into distress using discourse analytic methods has been 
the ubiquitousness of a medical discourse that constructs distress as mental 
illness (Georgaca, 2014). Clinical Psychology has been described as historically 
complicit in the dominance of a medical discourse in the mental health system in 
order to retain their professional power and status (Boyle, 2011). Newnes (2004) 
has suggested that three stances are open to clinical psychologists towards a 
medical discourse and the practices it legitimates: compliance, eclecticism, and 
radical opposition. Newnes (2004) observed that historically the profession has 
tended toward either compliance, i.e. using psychiatric terminology to label 
clients, or eclecticism, i.e. not using diagnoses but not actively challenging the 






be characterised as somewhere between eclecticism and the third option: radical 
opposition, i.e. the promotion of an alternative (de-medicalised) understanding of 
distress (Newnes, 2004).  
Another effect of the classification and categorisation of human beings is the 
formation of groups, with attendant minimisation of within-group differences and 
exaggeration of between-group differences (Turner, 1987). Throughout, 
participants in this study struggled with discursive practice that produces the 
clinical psychologist as different from other human beings on the basis of 
susceptibility to distress, a struggle that indicated the operation of dichotomising 
discursive practice within their social context. In the institution of mental health 
care dichotomising discursive practices, also known as 'us-and-them' thinking 
(Helmus et al., 2019; Richards, 2010) and 'othering' (Carroll, 2016; Maccallum, 
2002), construct a group of 'us' the mental health care professionals, bearers of 
the clinical gaze that objectifies the ‘them’ (Foucault, 1963/1973), i.e. the people 
subjected to, and subjugated by, the clinical gaze. Dichotomising discursive 
practice, othering, has been defined as a powerful subjectification process, a 
process that forms the subjectivity of those positioned as ‘other’ and also of those 
who occupy the position of the hegemonic subject in relation to this discursively 
defined other (Thomas-Olalde & Velho, 2011). Thus, the dichotomisation of 
mental health professionals and service users can be theorised as having a 
formative influence on the subjectivity of clinical psychologists, irrespective of 
their positioning in this discursively defined dichotomy. Dichotomising discursive 
practices were presented by participants as endemic in the professional and 
institutional context of the clinical psychologist. They presented these 
dichotomising discursive practices as problematic in terms of clinical practice, 
and as strongly implicated in circumscribing space for clinical psychologists to 
acknowledge and talk about their personal experiences of distress. 
It could be argued that the effects of the operation of dichotomising discursive 
practices in the formation of the professional identity of the clinical psychologist 
can also be seen in the qualitative study by Charlemagne-Odle and colleagues 
(2012). Their participants reported that experiences of personal distress 
conflicted with ideas of what is allowable, or expected, as a clinical psychologist, 






colleagues (2018) is complicated by the implications of the construction of 
distress as ‘mental health problems’ in their study. However, it could be argued 
that the effects of the construction of distress in terminology that evokes notions 
of distress as pathology, coupled with the operation of dichotomising discursive 
practice in the social context of study participants, explains their finding that the 
likelihood that clinical psychologists would tell someone about their distress was 
found to relate to self-stigma, and perceived stigma, but not the nature or severity 
of the distress as conceptualised in diagnostic terms (Tay et al., 2018). Stigma is 
associated with the construction of distress as mental illness (Georgaca, 2014), 
and the dichotomisation of people as either mentally ill or healthy serves to create 
and perpetuate the stigmatisation of distress (King, Brophy, Fortune et al., 2020). 
Construction of distress as mental illness, and the dichotomisation of clinical 
psychologists and others with regards to susceptibility to distress, arguably 
operates to construct all distress as stigmatising for the clinical psychologist, not 
necessarily certain expressions of distress more than others.  
Resistance to Dividing Practices and Dichotomising Notions 
The emphasis placed by participants in this study on a positioning of themselves 
as human beings, and the mobilisation of discourse that constructed distress as 
an aspect of the human condition, can be interpreted as resistance to the 
pathologisation of distress, and to their subjectification by dichotomising 
discursive practice operating within the social context. This resistance, occurring 
at the site where power operates, is the process of resistance as theorised by 
Foucault (1982). Participants drew on a range of discourses in the service of this 
resistance. Including Behaviourism, providing support for the view that the 
profession's origins in Behaviourism facilitates a de-pathologising perspective 
(Smail, 1995), and Humanism. While not explicitly a focus in the training of 
clinical psychologists, Humanism has historically offered a counter to the de-
humanising positivist and empiricist agendas that have dominated the practice of 
mainstream psychology (Parker, 1999; Tudor, 2015) and circulates in the socio-
cultural context as a result of the influence of the psy-professions in modernity 
(Parker, 2002; Rose, 1985). Humanist discourse may have particular appeal to 
clinical psychologists whose defining feature as a profession, David Smail (1995) 






this feature has been shaped by largely situational rather than discursive factors, 
i.e. by the location of the profession in the context of a public health service, the 
characteristics of the people they help, and their relative lack of formal power in 
this system compared with psychiatrists. The mobilisation of a CFT discourse by 
study participants, to enable a positioning of themselves as 'human', suggests 
that the emergence of Third-wave Cognitive Behavioural approaches has also 
offered clinical psychologists a discursive resource to construct distress as a 
normal aspect of human experience. Third-wave approaches (in their original 
forms at least) do not use a discourse of psychiatric diagnosis and are not, as 
such, as heavily implicated in dividing practices. However, it should be noted that 
these approaches stop short of radical opposition to the medicalisation of distress 
by labelling themselves ‘transdiagnostic’ treatments (e.g., P. Gilbert, 2009; 
Hayes, Strosahl & Wilson,1999). 
The medicalisation of distress within the institution of mental healthcare has been 
problematised by a number of authors. There are books devoted to this topic 
(e.g., Rapley, Moncrieff & Dillon, 2011; Speed, Moncrieff & Rapley, 2014). 
Dichotomising processes have been described as underpinning the 
stigmatisation of the recipients of mental health services (Richards, 2010), and 
professionals with lived experience who work in them (King, Brophy, Fortune et 
al., 2020; Rhodes, 2020). This study can be considered an original contribution to 
the literature as it illustrates the effects of the pathologisation of distress and 
dichotomising discursive practices on a professional group who are in a powerful 
social position in the institution of mental healthcare, clinical psychologists, and 
some of the discursive resources that can be drawn on in this context to resist 
subjectification by these discursive practices. 
The Clinical Psychologist as 'Expert' in Emotion Management 
While resistance to the pathologisation of distress and dichotomising discursive 
practice was more overt in participant's talk, there was a process of 
subjectification by a discourse that appeared more difficult for participants to 
resist. A discourse that constructed the clinical psychologist as someone who 
should, by virtue of their power-knowledge, have a superior capacity to manage 






Charlemagne-Odle and colleagues (2012) that “being seen as a coper” (p.249) is 
perceived as important by clinical psychologists, and with van Der Merwe's 
(2019) observation, stemming from her research into emotion management by 
psychologists in Australia, that psychologists are expected to be a model of the 
"perfect, worked over, emotionally limber self" (p.37). Participant's descriptions of 
the expectations that they and others had of their superior capacity to cope would 
seem to eschew the passive patient positioning invited by the medical model 
(Georgaca, 2014). Conceivably this could be attributable to the aforementioned 
dichotomising discursive practices and the positioning of the clinical psychologist, 
as ‘expert’ in mental health, in an ostensibly superior group with regards to 
distress. However, participant's talk about these expectations in this study also 
suggested the concurrent and interactive effects of the operation of a discourse 
that responsibilises the sufferer in the management of their distress, with 
particular implications for what is expected of the ‘expert’. 
Rose (1998) has argued that theoretical approaches in psychology share a 
common normativity in their construction of the individual as the self-contained 
locus of thought and action, responsible for their own behaviours and 
(mis)fortunes, i.e. the "unitary, individual, rational subject" (Venn, 1998, p.146) 
who has traditionally been the subject of mainstream psychology. He has opined 
that psychotherapeutic and medical discourses all individualise, de-contextualise, 
pathologise, and mystify distress (Rose, 1998). However, as regards the 
responsibilisation of the sufferer in the management of distress the discourse of 
the CBT psychotherapeutic approaches is most strongly implicated. Dalal 
proposes that the key notion contained in a CBT discourse is the following: "it is 
believed that you should be able to choose and determine what you feel and 
think. If you feel depressed say, then it is because you have not yet understood 
how to take control of your inner life." (2018, p.6). Thus, the ‘expert’ is produced 
by this discourse as someone expected to have a superior capacity to control 
their internal experience. Furthermore, in an influential UK government report by 
Lord Layard promoting CBT (Layard, 2006), happiness is produced as a state 
that all human beings should be able to achieve, with sufficient effort, irrespective 
of contextual or historical factors. Where happiness is constituted as a normal 






the management of emotional experience becomes a moral imperative, all 
suffering is, by default, constructed as dysfunctional and a moral failing (Dalal, 
2018). Notably, feelings of failure associated with the experience of distress were 
reported by a participant in this study, and, as reviewed in chapter one, have 
been reported by large numbers of psychological therapists, who also report 
distress, in NHS surveys. It has been suggested that the profession of Clinical 
Psychology in the UK have strongly affiliated themselves with the CBT paradigm 
(Dalal, 2018). An observation that would seem to be borne out by the status of 
CBT as a mandatory competency in the professional training of clinical 
psychologists. As such, it could be argued that this expectation of a superior 
capacity to cope, based in superior knowledge, is an example of the disciplining 
of the psy-professions by the regimes of selfhood they have played a role in 
inventing and perpetuating (Rose, 1998).  
It could be argued that the psychoanalytic construction of ‘expert’ carries a similar 
expectation of a superior capacity to manage distress experience, in the clinical 
encounter at least. However, the case could be made that this expectation is 
offset by the notions that the therapist will have their own neurosis and 
experience countertransference (as outlined in ch.1), and by the legitimisation of 
spaces for the therapist to receive emotional support, or containment, themselves 
(Berman, 2000; Stewart, 2002). The discourse of Third wave CBT approaches, 
mobilised by participants to allow a 'human' subject position for the psychologist, 
while perhaps appearing to be a rupture or change in systems of thought at first 
examination, does not allow an escape from the 'expert' position that carries the 
expectation of a superior capacity to manage distress autonomously. Similar to 
Behaviourism, these approaches expect the therapist to 'model' the ideal way of 
being for others (as outlined in chapter one), with any experience of distress 
safely located in the past, an expectation that implies a construction of the 
therapist as someone with a superior ability to manage their emotional 
experience. 
Resistance to a Techno-Scientific Construction of Professional Identity and Role 
It has been suggested that the marriage of the objective stance of science and 






been fraught with tensions from the beginning (Cheshire & Pilgrim, 2004). The 
discourse of science has historically been credited with constraining space for 
clinical psychologist vulnerability (Pilgrim & Treacher, 1992). More recently, the 
point has been made the tenuous balance that had been achieved between 
intersubjective, more intuitive, perspectives and the more technical, ostensibly 
more scientific, approaches in the formation of the clinical psychologist identity 
has been increasingly threatened by a drive for clinical psychologists to be 
defined as evidence-based practitioners (Dudley, 2017). Particularly in the 
context of a health service that privileges a form of evidence that gives CBT, a 
technical approach allied with more positivist iterations of science, an advantage 
over more intersubjective or intuitive psychotherapeutic approaches (Dalal, 2018; 
Guilfoyle, 2019). Participants in this study used the power-knowledge contained 
in their reflective-practitioner identity, and, with what could be argued was the 
intersubjective practitioner identity, to resist an institutional construction of their 
work as a technical process, performable by an automaton. A construction of 
their role and identity they presented as invalidating their emotional experience, 
and de-prioritising social practices that they presented as crucial in helping them 
to sustain their work. A number of study participants mobilised psychoanalytic 
discourse to construct a professional subjectivity that enabled particular stances 
and practices in relation to emotional experience. The psychoanalytic discourse 
constructs clinical work as a relational-affective process, and legitimates ongoing 
attention to the therapist's emotional experience in supervision practices (Milton 
et al., 2011). Though the stances enabled by this discourse, systemic factors 
contributing to worker distress could be elaborated, and emotional support for 
clinicians legitimised. However, psychoanalytic discourse, while useful in this 
context as a source of knowledge-power, was also presented by participants as a 
discursive framework that offered some constraints. The construction of the 
clinician as ‘container-expert’ risked re-producing an expert-patient dichotomy 
and constraining space for intersubjective relating. Furthermore, it was indicated 
that the power accorded by the ‘container-expert’ construction of professional 
identity, which could be characterised as a pastoral power (Foucault, 1982), may 
invite expectations of self-sacrificing practice by the clinical psychologist for the 






Emotional Control and Leadership 
There was some resistance to the effects of subjectification by discourse that 
constrained intersubjective relating, by participants in this study, with regards to 
clients and team members. However, these effects appeared harder to resist with 
an increase in seniority. It could be argued that this is due to the combined and 
interactive effects of subjectification by psychoanalytic, cognitive-behavioural, 
and neoliberal discourses constructing the subjectivity of the 'leader' in the NHS. 
The case can be made that these discourses function to support and reinforce 
each other to close down space for talk of vulnerability, particularly for more 
senior clinical psychologists, in the construction of the leader as someone who 
should exercise a superior control and restraint as regards their own emotional 
experience. It has been suggested that the capacity to monitor and control one's 
emotional experience is a marker of high status in a neoliberal society (Froyum, 
2010; Ilouz, 1997) and that emotional control is symbolic capital as a marker of 
professionalism (Ilouz, 1997). As previously noted, the CBT construction of 
‘expert’ carries similar expectations, and the rise to dominance of the CBT 
psychotherapeutic approaches has been attributed to their good fit with the 
modern neoliberal agenda (Hall, Pilgrim and Turpin, 2015). The NHS leadership 
framework’s construction of the NHS leader as someone with strong capacities 
for self-awareness and self-management suggests that the capacity to manage 
emotional experience in a self-reliant fashion is a valued form of cultural capital in 
the contemporary NHS. The discourse of resilience mobilised by some clinical 
psychologists in the promotion of clinical psychologists for leadership (e.g., Antibi, 
2012; Moyes, 2012) would seem to imply what participants suggested is a 
problematic construction of resilience, i.e. a stoic-type individualist construction of 
resilience that entails a denial of vulnerability and dependency needs.  
This study can be considered an original contribution to the literature in its 
illustration of the operation of psychotherapeutic and neoliberal discourse in the 
construction of the subjectivity and role of the clinical psychologist in the 
contemporary NHS. In particular, in the illustration of the discursive construction 
of the clinical psychologist as ‘expert’ or ‘leader’ who should exert a superior 






clinical psychologists in terms of talk about their own distress and access to 
supportive social practices within the institutional context.  
4.1.1.2. How do the discursive resources drawn on shape their accounts of how 
distress has been responded to and how they think it should be 
responded to? 
The reluctance to seek support from others, strategies of self-reliance, and 
attempts to persevere at work despite the experience of distress (Brooks et al., 
2002; Charlemagne-Odie et al., 2012) were presented by participants as 
practices supported by hegemonic discursive structures and institutional 
practices. Descriptions of the institutional context by participants in this study 
echo Charlemagne-Odle and colleagues (2012) participant’s descriptions of a 
culture of long working hours and skipped lunches in NHS organisations. 
Dominant discourses in the institutional context construct reality through the 
representations of it that they offer, the social practices these representations 
dictate, and truth effects that embody the realities as defined by these 
representations (Opie, 1997). Overall, the findings of this study provide support 
for the view that a neoliberal ideology, with its emphasis on productivity, the 
location of responsibility for distress and recovery in the individual, and denial of 
dependency needs, has had an adverse effect on service providers in the mental 
health services (Jackson & Rizq, 2019; Watts, 2017, Nov.4th).  
Self-care and the Repudiation of Dependency  
There is mounting evidence that all NHS workers are expected to work to tighter 
and tighter performance targets (Felstead et al., 2013), and this picture of the 
NHS context was reflected in participants talk. Neoliberal subjectivity has been 
described by Layton (2009) as a form of subjectivity that encourages manic 
activity, devalues caregiving, and denies the interdependence of human beings 
and human dependency needs. Study participant’s talk of the emphasis on 
activity over reflection, the de-valuation of supportive practices, and the 
promotion of an individualist form of resilience entailing self-reliance in the 
management of emotional experience, in institutional contexts, suggested that 






The various psychotherapeutic discourses allow, warrant, or dictate a range of 
social and material practices and constrain or de-legitimise others. The dominant 
psychotherapeutic model in the NHS, CBT, does not legitimise spaces for 
emotional support, instead aligning with a neoliberal ideology in the promotion of 
self-reliance in the management of a de-contextualised, individualised, distress 
experience (Jackson & Rizq, 2019). Individualising constructions of distress also 
dominate in literature and research on clinical psychologist distress (i.e. burnout, 
stress, mental health problems - as reviewed in ch.1.). The BPS Practice 
Guidelines (2017), while attributing a role to a supportive other, would appear to 
accord with the promotion of self-reliance, to a degree, in their direction that: 
"within their CPD plans and supervision psychologists should consider self-care 
and how they can maintain their own wellbeing." (p.12). Inevitably, the location of 
distress within the individual orients people and institutions to seek individualistic 
solutions to distress (Coles, 2010), and the discourse of self-management invites 
the repudiation of a need for dependency on others (Benjamin, 1990). Creating a 
discursive context supportive of practices such as the prioritisation of formative 
and normative aspects over restorative functions of supervision (Dooley & 
Peyton-Lander, 2014). Skovholt and Trotter-Mathison (2011) construct care of 
others as being in direct competition with self-care in their tome The Resilient 
Practitioner, and recommend various self-management techniques in addition to 
cautioning clinicians against co-dependant relationships. Dattilio (2015) places 
the responsibility for distress management squarely on the shoulders of the 
individual psychologist, describing psychologists as hypocritical in their resistance 
to using the self-care strategies they teach their clients, such as cognitive 
restructuring, mindfulness and maintaining a balanced lifestyle. Notably, the 
strategies he suggests are primarily those of CBT or Third-wave approaches. 
Mindfulness meditation, a core practice of Third-wave CBT approaches, has 
been widely promoted of late as a way of reducing NHS worker's distress (Lomas 
et al., 2018; Marx, Strauss & Williamson, 2014; Wise et al., 2012). It has been 
argued that Mindfulness Meditation is a neoliberal iteration of the original 
Buddhist meditation practice, stripped of the traditional ethical and moral basis 
(Purser, 2019). In this form, the meditation practice has been described as 
practice that responsibilises the individual in distress management, encouraging 






social action to address external causes of distress (Purser, 2019). The case has 
been made that the dominant discourse of resilience in the mental health 
services operates similarly to shift focus from social-contextual factors causative 
of distress to internal, individual factors (Harper & Speed, 2012). Study 
participant’s descriptions of what they presented as a problematic construction of 
resilience that operates in the institutional context evoked what has been 
described by Joseph (2013) as "embodied neoliberalism" (p.38). A construction of 
resilience that privileges autonomy and self-reliance, locating strength or 
weakness in the individual, and effectively diverting attention away from the 
examination of systemic factors (Joseph, 2013). Participants presented the 
expectation that they should manage distress autonomously as one that 
constrains their access to help. Similarly, participants in the study by 
Charlemagne-Odle and colleagues (2012) described the notion that, as 
psychologists, they should manage distress autonomously as one that delayed 
them seeking help.  
This study can be considered an original contribution to the literature in its 
illustration of the role of discursive structures that individualise and de-
contextualise distress in the creation of a social context in which access to 
supportive practices are constrained for clinical psychologists, and practices such 
as perseverance in attempts to meet demand, and inattention to embodied signs 
of distress, are supported.  
Making a Case for Supportive Practices – Clinical work as Emotional Labour 
Previous research has reported that psychologists describe the seepage of 
emotional experience from their professional lives impacting on their personal 
lives and that they engage in various self-care strategies outside of work hours to 
make them better professionals (van der Merwe, 2019). Arguably indicating that 
the pressure to be self-reliant in emotion management eats into personal time. 
Participants in this study constructed self-care as the setting of boundaries to 
protect their personal time. Overall, the case made by study participants for 
access to spaces in which talk of their emotional experience is legitimised is in 
line with one of the most consistent findings of research on psychologist distress 






psychologist’s experiences of distress (as outlined in ch.1.). Notably, participants 
in this study emphasised the role of social support in the work context, rather 
than the personal context, in sustaining clinical psychologists in their professional 
roles in the NHS. They resisted the construction of their work through discourse 
that supports self-reliant practices of emotion management by constructing 
distress as an inherent and unavoidable aspect of their work. This construction of 
clinical practice accords with research suggesting that the nature of a mental 
health professional's role, a role involving sustained contact with the distress of 
others, increases vulnerability to distress (Cohen & Collens, 2013; Knight, 1997; 
Moore & Cooper, 1996; Tehrani, Colville & Fraser, 2020). The way that study 
participants constructed their clinical practice and the importance they placed on 
having a connection to emotional experience (their own and the clients) reflected 
the concept of deep acting in Hochschild's (2012) theory of emotional labour. 
Hochschild proposed that social situations have particular feeling rules 
associated with them, i.e. rules that dictate the emotions that the social actors 
should feel or display in that context. She differentiated between surface acting, 
i.e. the outward performance by the social actor of the emotion the situation is 
believed to demand, and deep acting, i.e. a practice that entails the social actor 
endeavouring to induce these emotions (Hochschild, 2012). However, 
participant’s constructions of their clinical practice departed from Hochschild's 
(2012) theorising of emotional labour as a practice dictated solely by 
organisational demands. In line with Virkki's (2007) research on emotional labour 
in caring work, participants presented deep acting as a practice central to their 
professional identity, personally invested in as a source of professional and moral 
competence.  
From studies with psychiatric nurses, there is evidence supporting a link between 
the surface acting dimension of emotional labour10and burnout, particularly 
emotional exhaustion (Mann & Cowburn, 2005; Schmidt & Diestel, 2014; 
Zammuner & Galli, 2005). This finding has led researchers to suggest that 
training and practices should be in place to support deep acting in caring work 
(Mann & Cowburn, 2005; Schmidt & Diestel, 2014). Formal and informal 
relational practices that support the capacity for deep-acting were the types of 
                                                             






practices that participants made a case for, as practices that can respond to, and 
to a degree ameliorate, clinician distress stemming from the emotional labour 
entailed in the clinical role.  
Formal and Informal Supportive Practices 
Supervision was presented by study participants as a crucial form of formal 
support for the clinical psychologist at all levels of training and experience. There 
was a strong consensus between participants descriptions of the basis for 'good' 
supervision and the DCP's (2014) description of the quality of the supervisory 
relationship as crucial. The notion that the supervisor provides containment for 
the supervisee is reflected in this policy document, with a supportive and 
containing relationship between supervisor and supervisee cited as factors 
promoting satisfaction with supervision (DCP, 2014). Participant’s representation 
of teams as a potential source of informal emotional support resonates with 
findings that psychologists who do not work in teams report higher levels of 
psychological distress and lower job satisfaction than those who work in teams 
(Carter & West, 1999), and with the finding that experiences of friendship and 
emotional support within a team are associated with high staff satisfaction 
(Mickan, 2005; Opie, 1997; Onyett, 2003).  
Study participant's construction of relational reflective practices, that allow space 
for emotional experience, as a means of reducing the likelihood that a 
disconnection from emotional experience will occur resonates with the finding 
that supervision that the supervisee experiences as safe, emotionally supportive, 
and collaborative is associated with a reduced likelihood of emotional de-
personalisation for psychological practitioners (Johnson et al., 2020). Notably, in 
Johnson and colleague’s study, the quality of the supervisory relationship did not 
moderate emotional exhaustion. As reviewed in chapter one, there are a number 
of studies providing evidence that organisational factors, including demand and 
pressures of workload, are related to clinician distress (Cushway & Tyler, 1994, 
1996; Hannigan et al., 2004; Lasalvia, Bonetto & Bertani, 2009; Schulz, 
Greenley, Brown et al.,1995). Clinician’s experience of emotional exhaustion, in 
particular, has been linked to demand in other studies (Miller, 2018; Steel, 






demand, and a culture in which taking breaks is not supported, in the creation of 
a context that limits clinical psychologist’s options for managing work-related 
distress. However, there is evidence that social support in the workplace leads to 
reduced avoidance coping and a greater sense of control, which has a positive 
moderating effect on experiences of distress (Kuyken et al., 2003). This may be 
attributable to the potential for social support to validate emotional experience 
and link affective experience to context, reducing the likelihood that emotional 
experience discordant with dominant social norms will be constructed as 
dysfunctional by the individual and facilitating action in the external world to 
ameliorate distress (Thoits, 1985).  
This study can be considered a contribution to the evidence-base indicating that 
formal and informal relational-affective practices in the workplace, that offer 
space for clinical psychologist’s emotional experiences, are important 
considerations in thinking about systemic ways to respond to clinical 
psychologist’s distress in the NHS. 
Access to Formal and Informal Supports as Unreliable  
However, access to spaces that offer emotional support was presented by study 
participants as dilemmatic and carefully negotiated by clinical psychologists. 
Study findings accord with research providing evidence that relational reflective 
spaces on training can be experienced as conflictual and distressing by trainees 
(Hughes & Youngson, 2009; Knight, Sperlinger & Maltby, 2010; Woodward et al., 
2015). Participants in this study agreed with the conceptualisation of these 
relational reflective practices on training as entailing a deconstruction of self for 
the trainee (Gillmer & Marckus, 2003). However, they presented this 'self’ as a 
neoliberal subjectivity, that it would be useful to de-construct to build a form of 
resilience that will sustain trainees in qualified practice. Furthermore, findings of 
this study indicate that similar dilemmas and constraints on talk about personal 
distress exist for qualified psychologists, a finding in line with the conclusions 
drawn through research with populations of mental health professionals with lived 
experience of distress (King et al., 2020). Amplified, in the team context, one 
might assume, by discourses that operate within the NHS to construct the clinical 






emotional experience may function to offset the demand for self-sacrifice or self-
restraint that a subjectification that accords the clinician pastoral or leadership 
power demands. However, study participant’s suggested increasing barriers to 
accessing both formal and informal emotional support with increasing seniority. A 
circumstance that may go some way towards explaining the finding that 
psychological practitioner wellbeing does not increase in the UK with age, 
experience and years of service (Summers, Morris, Bhutai et al., 2020), in 
contrast with findings in the Australian (Di Benedetto & Swadling, 2014) and the 
US mental healthcare contexts (Rupert & Kent, 2007; Rupert & Morgan, 2005; 
Rupert, Stevanovic, & Hunley, 2009).  
Technologies of the Self or Confessional Practices? 
The case has been made that supervision and reflective practice can be 
conceptualised as modes of surveillance and confessional practices that operate 
to discipline the professional (T. Gilbert, 2001). It could be argued, on the basis of 
the findings of this study, that the distinction between these relational reflective 
practices as ‘technologies of the self’, that promote care of the self, or 
‘confessional practices’, that have a disciplinary function, is determined by the 
relation of power, and the discourses that structure these practices. Foucault 
(1976/1980) theorised that confessional practices take place in the context of a 
hierarchical binary relationship, as he suggested is usual in social practices 
structured by a psy-professions discourse (Foucault, 1963/1973). If discourses 
that pathologise distress and support the othering of those who experience 
distress structure professional relationships, talk about vulnerability by the 
clinician is likely to be constructed as the confession of potential for impairment, 
inviting surveillance from those in more powerful positions (Peterson, 2017). In 
this study, both container-contained and human-to-human relationships with 
supervisors were presented as facilitating the use of this relationship by the 
supervisee as emotional support. The container-contained relation can be 
construed as a hierarchical binary relation. However, supervision practice as 
structured by psychoanalytic discourse allows some space for supervisee 
emotional experience. The point has been made that a continuum view of 
distress, i.e. the view that every human being will inevitably experience distress, 






clinicians within mental health services (King et al., 2020). It could be argued that 
a continuum view of distress produces relationships as more symmetrical 
‘human’ relationships through resistance to dichotomising notions and dividing 
practices. Notably, in this study, a construction of distress as an aspect of the 
human condition, and the positioning as ‘human’ for the clinical psychologist, 
allowed talk of emotion in supervision and access to informal support from 
colleagues with a team.  
This study can be considered to make a contribution to a reflective examination 
by the profession of Clinical Psychology of the nature and use of formal and 
informal supportive practices by clinical psychologists, in training and qualified 
practice. 
4.2. Critical Review 
4.2.1. Limitations of the Research 
The generalisability of the findings is considered limited by the small, self-
selected nature of the sample. The recruitment method and the nature of the 
research questions may have led to a sample homogenous in significant ways. In 
particular: 
• Recruitment using the social media site Twitter may have led to the 
recruitment of a sample homogenous in terms of their values or political 
views. Twitter is not used by all clinical psychologists and is perhaps more 
likely to be used by those with a greater interest in public debates about 
mental health and social activism. Furthermore, while I had not previously 
posted on Twitter, I had in the past 'liked' posts by others. This provided 
information to participants about my interests and views and, in 
combination with the context of my training course, perhaps positioned me 
as a 'critical psychologist' creating a particular context for the conversation 
in interviews. 
• The sample was not diverse in terms of gender. The case could be made 
that the nature of the research questions created barriers to participation 
for male psychologists. It has been suggested that hegemonic 






constraints as regards talk about personal distress (Brody & Hall, 2016). 
Furthermore, primary socialisation processes (in childhood) are theorised 
to play a formative role in emotional socialisation and interact with the 
secondary socialisation that takes place in the formation of a professional 
identity (Cahill, 1999). Thus, discourses that operate in primary 
socialisation to construct gender identity, i.e. femininity as nurturing, 
masculinity as rational, may operate to bias the nature of discourses 
internalised in secondary socialisation, contributing to a male psychologist 
professional identity that differs in significant ways from a female 
psychologist professional identity. 
4.2.2. Quality Evaluation 
The quality of the research will be considered according to the principles of 
contribution, credibility and rigour set out by Spencer and Richie (2015).  
4.2.2.1. Contribution 
According to Spencer and Richie (2015), research can be considered to have 
contributed if it advances knowledge or understanding of policy, practice, or 
theory. This study aimed to make a contribution as a critical pedagogy to facilitate 
reflection on sites of oppression and resistance for clinical psychologists. 
Following Nikolas Rose (1998), the hope was that by rendering the historical 
contingency of the clinical psychologist’s construction as professional 'selves' 
more visible these constructions are opened up for interrogation and 
transformation. Critical reflection by clinical psychologists has the potential to 
disrupt unwelcome or oppressive identities (Davies, 2008). Thus, the research is 
intended to be emancipatory for the profession (Parker 2015), in the sense of 
facilitating reflexivity, and opening up spaces for new practices, in relation to 
personal distress. This can be framed as a process of 'conscientisation' of the 
professional group, i.e. the development of a critical awareness of oppression 
that creates an impetus for social change (Freire, 1968/1972). Conscientisation is 
a concept developed with reference to work with the most oppressed groups in 
society. However, while clinical psychologists are implicated in institutions and 
practices that can be considered oppressive, they can also feel oppressed by 






pointed out, even those considered by others as oppressors are also oppressed 
within an oppressive system.  
4.2.2.2. Credibility 
I have aimed to fulfil this criterion in a number of ways. Firstly, with reading post-
structuralist theory, as extensively as time allowed over the past three years, to 
ground my interpretation in theoretical understanding. The analysis was 
discussed with my supervisor at a number of points during the analytic process, 
which included a review of data extracts. He also provided feedback and critique 
on drafts of my analysis, to ensure that my analysis was grounded in the data.  
4.2.2.3. Rigour 
A rationale for the development of the research questions and the method 
chosen is provided in chapter 2, in addition to a detailed outline of the steps taken 
in the analytic process. A list of initial codes (appendix G) and an excerpt of 
coded interview data (appendix H) provide an audit trail of the analytic process. 
Seale's (1999) conceptualisation of objectivity as an attempt to step back from 
the data as much as possible was held in mind. Reflexivity was enhanced by the 
use of a reflective log (appendix J) throughout the research process and 
conversations with peers, colleagues, and supervisors. 
4.2.3. Learning 
Maintaining faithfulness to a relativist epistemological position proved more 
difficult than initially anticipated. As someone with experience of the contexts 
described, who has had a long and intense period of secondary socialisation into 
the symbolic universe that the participants drew from in constructing their 
experience, I found their constructions of reality personally compelling. I often 
found myself drawn away from a relativist epistemological position to a more 
epistemologically realist view of the social context constructed by participants in 
their talk. When it came to the data analysis, I initially struggled to step back from 
and treat psychological theory, in particular psychoanalytic concepts such as 
containment, as discursive constructions. The interpretative stage of analysis was 
anxiety-provoking, as I was aware that my interpretation of the data could 






struggled with the sense that I was invalidating participant’s experience through 
relativist interpretations by treating their experience as less 'real', and with the 
sense that I was privileging my voice over theirs in interpretation. Confidence was 
an issue, as might be expected with a novice researcher, and initially, my coding 
was more descriptive than interpretative, and I was frequently pulled into the 
personal narratives away from a focus on the questions the research was 
attempting to address. I found that I ended up discarding or amending a number 
of my initial codes (appendix I). Through this process, I learned the value of 
consultation with others, including my supervisor, colleagues, and people outside 
the psychology profession, to help me to achieve a distance from knowledge that 
I had been accustomed to treating as ontologically real.  
4.2.4. Reflexive Review 
4.2.4.1. Personal Reflexivity 
Over the course of the research process, certain aspects of my identity came to 
the fore in my reflective log:  
• My Irish identity: please see the reflective journal excerpt (appendix J) 
• My gender identity and gendered discourses of emotional expression. I 
identify as a feminist and have read quite widely on the topic. As such, 
feminist discourse structures my subjectivity, and my practices, to some 
degree.  
• My training and employment background (as secondary socialisations), 
including postgraduate training in CBT, an MSc in psychoanalytic theory, 
and a training in Clinical Psychology on a course aligned with a critical 
psychology position. 
• My own history of distress, in the context of training and work in the NHS, 
and my investment (time/money/emotional) in two years of personal 
Psychoanalysis (a process of secondary socialisation into this particular 
symbolic universe and a lived experience of being a 'patient') and what this 







The relevance of these aspects was considered throughout, but this did not 
entirely negate their influence. To give an example from the interview process, at 
one point, I asked: And in what way did the therapy, sorry I shouldn't assume, did 
the therapy help in that? Despite the correction, the question orients the 
interviewee to my position, thus creating a particular context for their response. 
While I intentionally kept questions broad and intervened as little as possible, my 
personhood and my positioning co-created the context of each interview. My 
embodied presence and communications through body language, leaning 
forward etc., when I made notes and when I did not, could have informed 
participants about my positioning in discourse, irrespective of whether I explicitly 
positioned myself linguistically (Ellingson, 2009).  
4.2.4.2. Epistemological Reflexivity 
Embodied experience is an aspect of experience particularly pertinent to the field 
of mental health and to developing understandings of distress (Georgaca, 2014), 
and one of the limitations of analytic interpretation that focuses on discourse 
stems from its emphasis on language and meaning, which can have the effect of 
making it difficult to give fuller consideration to materiality and embodied 
experience (Nightingale & Cromby,1999). Margaret Wetherell's affective practice 
theory (2012, 2013) could have provided an additional theoretical framework for 
an analysis of discourse, with a view to taking extra-discursive experience into 
account without divorcing these embodied experiences entirely from discourse.  
Furthermore, choice or investment in particular discourses, and the subject 
positions these discourses allow, is not theorised as simple or necessarily 
conscious (Hollway, 1989). It has been argued that any understanding of the 
formation of identity requires an account of the unconscious investment that a 
given individual has in taking up a particular position in discourse, as opposed to 
other available positions (Hollway,1984, p.238). Layton (2006, 2009) suggests 
that normative unconscious processes pull an individual to maintain and 
reproduce hegemonic ideological norms in the process of consolidation of what 
these norms suggest is the right kind of identity. According to Layton (2009), as 
these norms can be causative of distress unconscious collusion with them 






this study modelled on the psychoanalytically-informed approach to discourse 
analysis by Frosh, Phoenix and Pattman (2003) or Hollway and Jefferson (2000) 
could have allowed for an account of unconscious investment in subject 
positions. It has been suggested that a psychoanalytic approach is not 
necessarily incompatible with a critical realist position (Pilgrim, 2020).  
4.3. Implications  
4.3.1. Research 
There is a dearth of research investigating clinical psychologist’s experiences of 
distress, and more is warranted. On the basis of this study’s findings, the 
following specific recommendations for further research can be made: 
• Further quantitative research into NHS worker distress and access to 
supportive practices is merited. Including research investigating levels of 
access to relational reflective and supportive practices for clinical 
psychologists and other staff in the NHS, systemic moderators that enable 
and constrain access, and the relationship between access to these 
practices and worker wellbeing.  
• Available research and literature, as reviewed in chapter one, indicates 
similar levels of distress in allied mental health professional groups, and 
there is evidence that there may be similar barriers to help-seeking for 
other professional groups that work in mental health (Galbraith, Brown & 
Clifton, 2014; Garelick, 2012). Collective participatory research practices 
(Nelson, & Prilleltensky, 2010) to explore norms for social and emotional 
practice, and systemic factors related to NHS worker distress, could 
provide a basis for collective action to address distress experienced by 
NHS workers.  
• Further qualitative research exploring trainee and qualified clinical 
psychologist’s experiences of relational reflective and supportive spaces is 
merited. It has been suggested that reflective practice groups like PPD are 
difficult for trainees to make use of, particularly trainees from a minority 
ethnic background (Goodbody & Burns, 2011). Furthermore, it has been 
argued that these practices have the potential to contribute to the 






privileging of white western discourses in these contexts (Goodbody & 
Burns, 2011). As such, the use of these spaces by trainees and qualified 
psychologists from minority ethnic backgrounds, and the exploration of 
alternative more ethnically and culturally diverse discourses to inform 
these practices, merits particular attention. 
• There was some diversity in the study sample as regards ethnicity. 
However, the implications of this aspect of difference was not explored. 
Such an exploration is merited in future research, particularly as it has 
been reported that Asian-British psychological practitioners in the NHS 
report a higher level of wellbeing than their White-British colleagues 
(Summers et al., 2020). 
4.3.2. Practice 
4.3.2.1. Clinical Psychologists 
The following practice recommendations can be made: 
• That clinical psychologists consider radical action in relation to 
dichotomising discursive practice and discourse or practice that 
perpetuates the pathologisation and de-contextualisation of distress. There 
is evidence that supervisors and senior clinicians play a pivotal role in 
communicating the norms for emoting by staff in mental health services, 
including norms for talk about lived experience of distress (Peterson, 2017; 
Harris, Leskela & Lakhan, 2019). Clinical psychologists can take the lead 
in promoting a culture that does not stigmatise distress by promoting a 
continuum view of distress in mental health services (King et al., 2020). 
• Clinical psychologists can engage in self-care, and model good self-care 
practice for other staff, by taking regular breaks during the workday and 
protecting their personal time by resisting pressure to work over their 
contracted hours.  
• While not dismissing the value of self-management techniques entirely, it 
is recommended that the potential for a discourse of self-management to 
contribute to the creation of a context that constructs the experience of 
distress as failure and constrains help-seeking is held in mind, particularly 






training for staff teams. It is recommended that clinical psychologists take 
the lead in promoting mutual care and dependence on others in addition to 
self-care in organisations, i.e. by advocating for protected time for 
supervision, psychotherapy, peer support and relational reflective practice. 
• That clinical psychologists find or create spaces, for example, in 
supervision, peer supervision or peer support groups, that support the 
exploration of the discursive construction of personal-professional 
identities and practice implications of these constructions. Collective 
externalising conversations could facilitate psychologists to give an 
account of the effects of discourses, norms, and practices on their lives 
(White, 1991). The location of the problem of psychologist distress in the 
external world has the potential to provide a solid basis for individual and 
collective action to address professional and systemic factors contributing 
to clinical psychologist distress in the NHS. 
• That clinical psychologists advocate for, and participate in, collective multi-
disciplinary reflection on the norms for emotional and social practice that 
have acquired a truth status for mental health professionals, as people 
located in a similar discursive context. It has been argued that challenging 
the de-contextualisation and pathologisation of distress, and building 
worker resilience, requires what Foucault (1982) called a transversal 
resistance, based in solidarity between workers from different disciplines 
and collective ethics (Guilfoyle, 2005; Reynolds, 2011). 
4.3.2.2. Policy Makers 
As a population-level intervention that guides behaviour and supports people and 
institutions to make choices, policy has the potential to have a powerful influence 
on people’s personal and professional lives (Ruggeri, 2017). Policy implications 
of this study at the service level and the societal level are considered, with 
reflection on the role of the clinical psychologist in policymaking at these levels: 
Service level 
In 2016, it was reported that over two-thirds of NHS trusts did not have plans or 
policies in place to support staff wellbeing (Hacker-Hughes, Rao, Dosanjh et al., 






Foundation Trusts in London and surrounding areas revealed that some trusts 
still may not have policies in place that pertain to supporting staff wellbeing at 
work, even when the idea of a policy to support staff wellbeing at work is defined 
more broadly. Some trusts have published policies that pertain to supporting staff 
with stress (e.g., The Tavistock and Portman Mental Health Foundation Trust, 
2019; The Central and North West London NHS Foundation Trust, 2018) and 
review of these policies indicated that they could be interpreted as policies for 
supporting staff wellbeing at work.  
Clinical psychologists, as senior clinicians, can take an active role in enquiring 
about and contributing to the review, and if necessary the development, of policy 
to support staff wellbeing in their respective services. The NHS Health and 
Wellbeing Framework (NHS, 2018) is recommended as a helpful reference for 
this process, with some caveats. A discourse encouraging self-management of 
distress by staff would appear to be privileged in the sections: Upskilling Staff and 
Line Managers and Access to Interventions. It is suggested that the discourse of 
self-management could be tempered by an emphasis on recommendations in the 
section that pertains to systemic factors in this framework: Create a Healthy and 
Supportive Working Environment. Additionally, there is a suggestion in this 
framework that senior managers should be trained to notice “signs and symptoms 
of poor mental health” in staff (NHS, 2018, p.47). This discourse would appear to 
support, or at least align with, a construction of distress as pathology and has 
overtones of surveillance. An awareness of the language used to describe 
distress, and proposed interventions, and the implications of language chosen is 
also recommended. The Managing Psychological Wellbeing at Work Policy 
produced by the East London Foundation Trust (2017), a trust rated as 
outstanding by the Care Quality Commission (CQC) in 2018, can also be 
recommended as a useful example of a service-level policy to support staff 
wellbeing. Of particular note is the use of the demand-control-support model 
(Johnson & Hall, 1988) to inform and structure the policy and the linking of the 
policy to a Work-Life Balance Policy, a move that underlines the trust’s 







Ideally, service-level policy initiatives would be supported by government policy 
initiatives. While services can work to implement policy that protects existing staff 
from work-related distress, these service-level policies do little in practice to 
reduce the demand on mental health services, and are likely to have little impact 
on a capacity to meet demand that relates to staffing levels. A wealth of research 
provides evidence that social inequality has a powerful effect on psychological 
and physical health (Cromby et al., 2013; Marmot, 2010; Pickett & Wilkinson, 
2010; Read & Sanders, 2010). Social policies in the areas of housing and 
welfare, and policies that support community development approaches to 
distress, have the potential to reduce demand for mental health services in the 
longer-term by impacting on levels of distress at a population level (Psychologists 
Against Austerity, 2015; Harper, 2016). In the short-to-medium-term capacity to 
meet demand in mental health services could be increased by an increase in 
staffing levels in mental health services. Government policies that aim to increase 
staffing levels, including policies that improve the pay and conditions of staff in 
the NHS to attract and retain people in these public service roles, are merited. 
There are increasing opportunities for psychologists to be involved in social 
policymaking, in-directly through communications to their representatives in the 
BPS (BPS Public Policy Team, 2019), and more directly through links with their 
local MPs, commissioners and policy makers. The concept of ‘wellbeing’ has 
recently come back on the government’s policy agenda (Perriard-Abdoh & 
Murray, 2020). However, all policy is ideological at some level (Ruggeri, 2017), 
and the process of policymaking commonly starts from the existing perspectives 
and preferences of decision-makers (Perriard-Abdoh & Murray, 2020). Walker, 
Speed and Taggart (2018) argue for a view of policymaking as a politically- 
motivated process, proposing that psychological research only has the potential 
to inform policy development when it aligns with current political interests. They 
offer the Increasing Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) as an exemplar of 
this argument, a programme aligned with the Governments of the time’s 
neoliberal ideological position. Neoliberalism still holds sway in political systems 
in the UK, although it has been argued that the Covid-19 pandemic provides the 
impetus for a change in ideology (Saad-Filho, 2020). The findings of this study 






However, when a direct influence on policymaking is unlikely, another avenue 
open to clinical psychologists is involvement in social activism, in solidarity with 
others affected by the same social problems (Walker et al., 2018). It is 
recommended that clinical psychologists work in solidarity with NHS colleagues 
and service users to influence policy at the government level, engaging in 
lobbying and other forms of social activism. Networks such as Psychologists for 
Social Change (http://www.psychchange.org/#) provide opportunities for 
psychologists at all levels to be involved in the application of psychology to policy 
making and political action.  
4.3.2.3. Training Programmes 
The following recommendations can be made for training programmes: 
• The promotion of open communication by trainees, course staff, and 
supervisors about their own vulnerabilities and psychological wellbeing to 
challenge the stigma associated with mental health difficulties within the 
profession, as recommended by Grice and colleagues (2018).  
• That PPD is given a high priority on training and the process carefully 
considered. Smaller groups (10-13) with facilitators trained in group 
processes have been recommended (Knight et al., 2010). Michael White's 
(1991) deconstructive method could provide a framework for the 
development of these spaces as usable spaces for talk about emotional 
experience by trainees. White (1991) suggests that a process of opening 
up reflection on ways of being that shape our existence creates space for 
choosing alternatives. Additionally, Windslade’s (2002) discourse analytic 
method for exploration of the subjectivities produced by the various 
psychotherapeutic discourses, developed for professional identity 
development work in counselling trainee groups, could be adapted for 
clinical psychologist trainee groups. 
• That there is careful consideration by training courses as to whether there 
is a preference for recruitment of people who perform a stoic-type 
resilience over trainees who are open about experiences of personal 
distress and can contribute to discussions supporting a continuum view of 






Psychology Training and Disability (Harper et al., 2006) is recommended 
as a useful resource for training courses in this regard.  
4.3. Conclusion 
A recently published DCP briefing paper validates a continuum model in thinking 
about clinical psychologist’s distress stating "People in the Clinical Psychology 
profession can experience mental health difficulties at any (or all) stages of their 
career." (Hogg & Kemp, 2020, p.1). When distress is seen as part of the human 
condition and the humanity of clinical psychologists is acknowledged this 
statement seems obvious. Yet the authors clearly felt it was a statement that 
needed to be made. The ways that clinical psychologists in the NHS have been 
positioned by language, social practices, and institutions has complicated the 
acknowledgement of a shared human vulnerability by clinical psychologists, 
creating constraints to clinical psychologist’s ways of being in relation to personal 
distress. However, as illustrated by this study, the clinical psychologist 
professional identity offers scope for a variety of stances and practices in relation 
to distress, including distress experienced by clinical psychologists themselves. 
Stances and practices that align with current institutionally-validated discourses 
and practices, and those that could be construed as counter-conducts that create 
space for new ways of ways of being in relation to distress. Foucault (1982) 
described resistance as "not to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are" 
(p.216). When resistance is conceptualised as the fracturing of the limitations 
imposed by normalising identity categories the contested knowledge base of 
Clinical Psychology, and the profession’s struggle to reach a consensus on what 
the profession does and why (Cheshire & Pilgrim, 2004), is revealed as a 
strength. Butler (2015) conceptualises acknowledgement of vulnerability as "a 
condition of resistance'" (p.184), and it is through acknowledgement of 
vulnerability that space can be made for a resistance to professional and 
institutional factors that constrain space for clinical psychologist’s experiences of 
distress. By acknowledging a shared human vulnerability and the mutual 
interdependence of human beings, clinical psychologists can help to open up 
space for improvisation in professional identity performances, and create a basis 
for the solidarity required for collective action to bring about transformative 
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APPENDIX B: Participant de-briefing sheet 
PARTICIPANT DEBRIEFING INFORMATION 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this study. 
Data will now be analysed using a discursive approach which aims to identify the 
discourses in the interactional and socio-cultural world of the Clinical 
Psychologist, the way in which these discourses construct the professional 
identity of Clinical Psychologist, and the implications of this construction of 
identity for the experience of personal distress by the Clinical Psychologist. 
You are free to with draw your data at any point up to the commencement of the 
data analysis, one week from now. 
I plan to disseminate the study findings through publication in psychology journals 
and presentation at psychology conferences. 
It is hoped that the study will contribute to positive changes within the profession, 
stemming from the profession itself, changes that will increase the wellbeing of 
Clinical Psychologists and also by extension benefit their clients. 
If you have been distressed by this interview and would like some support with 
this distress the following options are available in your area: 
Option 1: For a non-judgemental listening service call the Samaritans on 116 123 
Option 2: Contact your GP for referral to an NHS primary care mental health 
Service 
Option 3: Source private psychotherapy, for example through one of the following 
websites: 
o British Association of Counselling and Psychotherapy: 
https://www.bacp.co.uk/search/Therapists 
o The British Psychotherapy Foundation: 
http://www.britishpsychotherapyfoundation.org.uk/Find-a-Therapist 







o Institute of Psychoanalysis: http://www.psychoanalysis.org.uk/find-
ananalyst. 
[This is selection of websites that offer options for sourcing private counselling or 
psychotherapy. It is not intended to be exhaustive or an endorsement of any 
particular modality, clinician or practice] 
In the case of a crisis Call 111 - if you urgently need medical help or advice but it 
is not a life threatening situation. Call 999 - if you or anyone else is in immediate 
danger or harm. You can also speak with your GP or go to your Go to your 
nearest Accident and Emergency department (A&E). You can search for your 
local department through the NHS Choices website If there any questions that 
you would like to ask or concerns that you would like to share please give me a 
call on  or contact me by email on  
If there any questions that you would like to ask or concerns that you would 









APPENDIX C: Twitter post 
CALL FOR CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGISTS CONCERNED ABOUT DISTRESS 
EXPERIENCED WITHIN THE PROFESSION. 
Are you a Clinical Psychologist working in the NHS? 
Could you give up 1- 1.5 hrs of your time to participate in a research interview?  











APPENDIX D: Interview schedule 
 
 
PARTICIPANT INVITATION LETTER 
You are being invited to participate in a research study. Before you agree it is 
important that you understand what your participation would involve. Please take 
time to read the following information carefully.   
Who am I? 
I am a postgraduate student in the School of Psychology at the University of East 
London and am studying for a Doctorate in Clinical Psychology. As part of my 
studies I am conducting the research you are being invited to participate in. 
What is the research? 
I am conducting a psycho-discursive study of Clinical Psychologists working in 
the NHS with a view to gaining a greater understanding of the profession and 
their experience of working in the context of the NHS. 
My research has been approved by the School of Psychology Research Ethics 
Committee. This means that my research follows the standard of research ethics 
set by the British Psychological Society.  
Why have you been asked to participate?  
You have been invited to participate in my research as someone who fits the kind 
of people I am looking for to help me explore my research topic. I am looking to 
interview Clinical Psychologists that work either full or part-time in the NHS and 






I emphasise that I am not looking for ‘experts’ on the topic I am studying. You will 
not be judged or personally analysed in any way and you will be treated with 
respect.  
You are quite free to decide whether or not to participate and should not feel 
coerced. 
What will your participation involve? 
If you agree to participate you will be asked to participate in two interviews to talk 
about being a Clinical Psychologist. The interviews can take place at a location 
and at a time that suits you. It is anticipated that they will last for 1 to 1.5 hours. 
The approach adopted for the interview is a ‘Free Association Narrative Interview 
approach’ with space for you to speak uninterrupted and some open questions. 
The second interview will be a ‘follow-up’ interview comprising of questions to 
follow-up on material discussed in the first interview and to discuss any further 
thoughts you had after the first interview. Interviews will be audio-recorded and 
transcribed by me.  
I will not be able to pay you for participating in my research but your participation 
would be very valuable in helping to develop knowledge and understanding of the 
profession of Clinical Psychology and the experience of being a Clinical 
Psychologist in the NHS. 
Your taking part will be safe and confidential  
Your privacy and safety will be respected at all times.  
• You will not be identified by the data collected, on any written material 
resulting from the data collected, or in any write-up of the research.  
• You will not have to answer all questions asked of you and you can opt to 
stop your participation at any time 
What will happen to the information that you provide? 
What I will do with the material you provide will involve: 







• Your name and contact details will not be linked to the interview data. All 
interview data will be anonymised by the use of pseudonyms.  
• Anonymised interview data will be stored on a password-protected computer. 
• Supervisors and examiners will have access to anonymised data contained 
within the thesis. 
• It is hoped that the anonymised data will form part of a paper that will be 
published and that the finding of the study will be presented at psychology 
conferences. 
• Your contact details will be deleted once the data analysis is complete. 
Interview recordings will be deleted after the award of the degree. 
What if you want to withdraw? 
You are free to withdraw from the research study at any time without explanation, 
disadvantage or consequence. However, if you withdraw I would reserve the right 
to use material that you provide up until the point of my analysis of the data.  
Contact Details 
If you would like further information about my research or have any questions or 
concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me.  
RESEARCHER NAME & UEL EMAIL 
If you have any questions or concerns about how the research has been 
conducted please contact the research supervisor [supervisor name] School of 
Psychology, University of East London, Water Lane, London E15 4LZ,  
Email: [supervisor’s email]  
or  
Chair of the School of Psychology Research Ethics Sub-committee: Dr Mark 










APPENDIX E: Interview schedule 
Interview Schedule 
1. What comes to mind when you think of Clinical Psychology? 
2. Can you tell me about your role as a Clinical Psychologist in the NHS 
3. What do you understand by ‘psychological distress’? 
4. What comes to mind when you think of a Clinical Psychologist experiencing 
psychological distress? 
o Have you any had experience of personal psychological distress? 
o Can you tell me about any experience that you have had of 
colleagues who have experienced personal psychological distress? 
Prompts: 
Can you tell me more? 
Can you tell me what happened…and then… 
Can you tell me what you mean by? 
Can you describe? 
Metaphors/analogies - explore 
Request examples 
6. Can you tell me your thoughts on ways that the likelihood of experiencing 
personal psychological distress could be reduced for clinical psychologists in the 






























APPENDIX G:  Initial researcher-derived codes 
Code 
CP as human 
CP as professional - boundaries 
CP as expert - container 
CP as leader 
CP as empathic 
CPs as a heterogenous group 
CP as helper 
CP’s as academic 
CP as reflective practitioner 
CP as advocate for reflective space for others 
CP brings multiple perspectives 
CP as responsible for others 
CP as self-reliant 
CP as immune 
CP as activist 
CP as anti-diagnosis 
CP works with trauma 
CPs leaving the NHS  
CP as pastor – self-sacrificing 
CP as robot – institutional construction 
CP helps others to reflect 
CP as slave 
CP as soldier 
CP as constrained from talk about distress 
CP as superior coper 
CP use individualist models -pathologising 
CP as objective, rationale 
CP normalises distress 
CP’s as more thought than feelings 
CP contains MDT colleagues  
CP has a service development role 
CP as isolated expert 
CP needs to be open to distress 
CP power within the system as limited 
CP ignores embodied responses 
CP has no permission to talk about distress  
Distress as inherent to the work of the CP 
Distress as held in an internal space with limited capacity 
Distress as human experience  






Distress affects functioning  
Distress as a response to life difficulties 
Distress as caused by experience in the external world 
Distress as managed relationally 
Distress as something you must tolerate (clinical work) 
Distress as something to be controlled 
Distress as hidden (by professional) 
Distress as inherent to the work of the CP 
Distress as something to be understood 
Distress as embodied threat response 
Distress as stigmatising (gen) 
Distress as stigmatising (CP) 
Distress as shameful 
Distress as feeling of pointlessness 
Distress as struggles 
Distress as unpleasant experience  
Distress as feeling overwhelmed, unbearableness 
Distress as mental health problems 
Distress as feeling powerless 
Distress as frightening/horrifying 
Distress shuts down thinking – no outlet 
Distress as prohibited - norms 
Distress as something to be understood through reflection 
Distress as something that builds over time 
Distress as traumatising 
Distress as a liquid 
Distress as pathologised (norm) 
Distress as impairment 
Distress as existential distress – values conflict 
Distress as something you push through 
Distress as the breakdown of a coping strategy 
Distress as something you take in 
Stigma in self-to-self relating 
Peer relationships as important 
Dichotomisation psychologists/others 
Dividing practices 
Client position as dangerous 
MDT – sense of belonging 
Personal and professional -boundaries 
Self-care as time boundaries 
Self-care requires systemic support 
Space as relational – facilitating environment 
MDT rel.s. as human connection 






Containment as practical help (supervisor) 
Supervision as holding - containment 
MDT staff distress as a collective experience 
Talk of distress as relational risk 
Talk of distress as informal 
Emotion as a resource 
Talking about distress depends on the quality of the relationship 
Reflective space as key to managing emotion 
Training as a socialisation into practices of relating to emotion 
Understanding as requiring reflective space 
Team relationships as supportive – sustenance  
Training provides insufficient preparation for exp. of distress 
Talking about distress requires systemic support 
Talk of distress by CP as shocking to others 
Mercurial norms for emoting 
Self-reliance as problematic resilience 
Supervisors offer practical guidance 
Human responses to distress as important  
Resilience as problematic (‘robustness’) 
Reflective space under threat  
Reflective space as relational 
Emotional experience as something accepted/acknowledged or cut 
off (othering) 
Managing demand from the system – boundaries 
personal/professional life 
Clinpsy as a striving profession 
Empathy as central to the work 
Clinical work requires attention to own emotional exp 
Internal experience as something you connect to 
Internal space with limited capacity - containment 
Systemic support for managing demand as fortunate 
The system pathologises distress 
Pathologisation of distress (norm) 
Relationship to emotion/emotion practice as socialised 
Trainees are socialised pre-training  
Courses recruit for Stoic resilience 
Compassion/empathy 
Relationships outside of work as important 
Modelling a different way of being -showing vulnerability 
Courses as different, variable 
Training as needing to normalise distress 
Peer rels as support 
Supervision as emotional support - sustenance 






Personal therapy as an alternative space for emotional dev 
Different way of being - modelling vulnerability and coping 
Need for validation in expressing emotion 
MDT rels allow a different way of being (human) 
Othering as a defence 
Training courses should foster friendships 
Supervision must be safe 
Bad experience of supervision (unsafe) 
System prioritises targets/performance 
NHS context as overwhelming 
Resilience – Stoic 
Supervision as a relationship 
Relational space for emotion less available with seniority 
Reflective space as avoided  
Training encourages emotional avoidance 
Emotion not spoken about openly on training 
Seeking help as difficult for CP’s  
Training and emotional development 
Professional context as unsafe for disclosure of distress 
Talk of distress as talk of vulnerability 
Talk of distress as confession 
Use of reflective space as difficult 
Use of reflective space as learned/socialised 
Supervision as surveillance 








APPENDIX H: Transcript excerpt with coding 
Please note:  
• This except is selected from a later point in the interview (~17 minutes) to 
protect participant anonymity. The earlier part of the interview contained 
the most potentially identifiable information (i.e. description of the 
participant’s service context and role). One additional segment of text 
containing information that might have compromised anonymity has also 
been removed. 
• This is presented as an example – all codes utilised for each segment of 
data are not necessarily shown 
Speaker Transcript Coding -examples 
Researcher And when you think, I suppose when you 
think of a clinical psychologist experience 





em, hmmm I think we like to pretend that we 
don't, or we can manage it or we can handle 
it, em, I think we, well I'll speak for myself I, 
you know, its not something I'm great at is 
going and asking for help, from an emotional 
point of view, you know I have to really trust 
somebody, em, and I think you know we work 
in a system where we see all sorts of things 
go on that we wouldn't support and we 
wouldn't want to happen to us , em, I think 
you know its quite difficult to get past that sort 
of internal stigma really of feeling its not ok to 
not be ok, we have to be kind of on top of 
everything and strong 
CP as superior coper  
Distress as hidden (by the 
professional 
Distress as something to be 
controlled 
CP as self-reliant 
Dividing practices 
Client position as dangerous 
Distress as stigmatising 
Stigma in self-to-self relating 
Resilience - Stoic  
Researcher And where do you..[I] sorry you go ahead.[no 







about that internal stigma, do you have an 




Em, I suspect its not, not unique to 
psychologists particularly. I suspect its there, 
well I know it is there across the board. I think 
its just when you are in a helping profession it 
can be that much more, eh of a barrier, em, 
and particularly when you think, you know, 
you are spending all your time in your or a lot 
of the time in your day to day working life 
trying to say to people look its ok, its normal 
to feel like this and of course you feel like 
that, and you are out there fighting stigma 
and saying we need to talk about mental 
health, but then when it comes to our own 
mental health em, you know, thats a different 
piece of work really. Its much easier to direct 
things outwards. Its rather like self-
compassion, you know we, I went to a talk by 
Kristen Neff and she was saying their 
research says you know 84% of people find it 
easier to be compassionate towards others 
rather than towards themselves and I guess 
its probably all part of that really, that turning 
of compassion and care on ourselves is so 
difficult, em, I don't know. And I suppose we 
are, you know, people are drawn into a 
helping profession because they want to help 
other people em, and maybe neglect 
themselves. And I think also em, one of the 
things I think there is a lot of language and 
casual conversation that goes on in mental 
health thats quite stigmatising and so to 
Distress as stigmatising 
(gen) 
CP as helper 
Distress as stigmatising (for 
CP) 
CP’s normalise distress 






CP as academic 
Compassion/empathy 
CP as human 
CP as pastor- self-
sacrificing 
CP as helper 












actually say you know when you are with 
colleagues.. 
[section removed to protect anonymity] 
..they will stand and they will talk about oh 
this person with PD and that person, and that 
othering which happens alot in conversations 
I think between mental health professionals 
can make it really difficult to say actually I am 
one of those people, em, you know there is 
still this implicit barrier i think, that, you know, 
when you're a health care professional you're 
not the person with personality disorder, sorry 
its a term I hate and detest but it is the one 
that draws the most kind of eh critical 
comments, em and when you see the way 
people are treated you, you know, you are 
not going to want to see yourself in that role 
you're going to want to stay in the more 
powerful role aren't you, so yeah I think its, it 
is also to do with the context we are in 
because for all the talk about de-stigmatising, 
I seem to remember that time to change had 
a look at this and found that actually while 
attitudes in the general population had 
improved  in mental health they'd actually 
gone backwards and people were being more 
stigmatising and not less, so as, if you are 
there as someone with a dual-identity, if you 
want to call it that, its very hard to fess up and 
go well actually I have significant mental 
health problems myself because the 
language and the attitudes people use are, 
you know, they're not, em, positive, or even 
neutral, you know the underlying tone is often 
 
 
CP’s as anti-diagnosis 
Dichotomisation of 
psychologists/others 
CP as professional -
boundaries 
 




Client position as dangerous 
Dividing practices 
Distress as stigmatising 
(gen) 
Distress as mental health 
problems 











very critical and negative em, we have alot of 
work to do 
Researcher And when you say dual-identity what do you 





Well I suppose its, it is a term that you see 
where people say, you know, I'm a healthcare 
professional but I'm also a user of mental 
health services or I also have my own mental 
distress eh, as I say again I use it in inverted 
commas really as a shorthand eh because I 
guess its probably more than dual there's 
probably multiple identities that we have but I 
guess those two can be the eh, sometimes 
the most difficult to bring together, and you 
know I think, I'm not sure that we are very 
good at understanding what people need in 
order to support their mental health at work, 
em, and i don't, I mean, I don't know, I mean 
I've not had any negative experiences myself 
but I've heard from colleagues who've had 
negative experiences sometimes when 
they've shared something about their own 
kind of mental issues or distress eh people 









Distress as prohibited 
(norms) 
 
Distress as stigmatising 
(gen) 
Client position as dangerous 
Talk about distress as a 
relational risk 
 [section removed to protect participant 
anonymity] 
 
Researcher But psychologists too can experience this 
barrier to speaking about..[Oh Yes]..distress? 




Yes, yes, definately, definately. I mean I went 
to, [removed] and Natalie Kemp was there 
talking about her experiences, em and you 
know she speaks extremely eloquently 
CP as activist 
Modelling a different way of 






APPENDIX I: Discarded initial codes - examples 
Code Action  Rationale  




code – content 
unclear 
• Talk of distress as risky 
 
Broken down into a number 
of codes i.e. 
• Talk of distress as 
talk of vulnerability 
• Talk of distress by 
CP as shocking to 
others 
• CP as immune 
• Dichotomising 
practices 
Too broad  
• Dual-identity discourse 
 










Replaced by:  
• Distress as 
embodied threat 
response 
Did not capture 
the content 
succinctly 





and descriptive  
• CP’s have an ethical 
responsibility to notice 
distress  
Replaced by: 
• Distress as 
impairment 





not capture the 
underlying 
constructions 
of distress, and 





• CP’s who shout as 
incompetent, childlike 
• Distress as seen by 
others as 
weakness/incompetence 
Replaced by:  




• CPs must negotiate for 
reasonable demands 
Replaced by:  
• CP power within the 









APPENDIX J: Reflective Log (excerpt) 
Interview with CP 4: A good rapport was established early on. Interview felt intimate, with 
the participant talking like she was talking to a friend or close colleague. Setting in 
participants home, at the weekend, talk of kids at intervals when they could be heard in 
the background. Perhaps the participant felt more comfortable and revealed more that 
she would have otherwise [note this participant expressed concerns afterwards about 
anonymity, perhaps she felt the more intimate context lead to her revealing too much -
evokes strong feelings about protecting participant’s anonymity ] I experienced feelings 
of admiration for the participant, identification, feelings of similarity based in shared 
experience, it was hard to stand back from the narrative in the interview, and I was 
conscious of making an effort to maintain a focus on prompts that encourage clarification 
and elaboration. 
Re: participant “wearing heart on sleeve”/being told that she is too emotional – strong 
feelings of identification with this relationship with emotional experience. My Irish identity- 
a difference I have noticed between UK and Irish cultural contexts is the permission to 
express emotion. Emotion seems to be considered a more private experience in the UK, 
with public expression of emotion considered “awkward”. The Implication seeming to be 
that showing feelings is not ok, not acceptable? “Wearing heart on sleeve”.. this has 
negative connotations? Origins in medieval times jousting, in jousting presumably 
wearing one’s heart on ones sleeve meant one could be easily killed. Associations with 
weakness, in men. Discourses of masculinity/femininity? Clinpsy and patriarchal 
discourse? Are there other references to display of emotion as unacceptable? Display as 
unacceptable vs having the feeling as unacceptable. Emotion as internal experience vs 
emotion as a communicated experience. Distress and struggling and emotion seem to 
be used interchangeably.I recall, in a work context, a colleague describing a client 
voicing angry feelings as “having a paddy”. I remembered thinking at the time that 
‘paddy’ were what Irish people were called in England, linked to colonial racialisation. 
Irish people seen as too emotional by English standards or norms? Too angry? Because 
anger was de-contexualised/de-historicised? The term Paddy bring to mind 
‘Paddywagon’ i.e. police van – discipline/law and order. How do these associations, 
indicative perhaps of a particular relationship to the norms for emoting in a UK cultural 
context influence my relationship to and interpretation of the data? But I have also been 
socialised not to show my emotions more in accordance with these norms, i.e. not 
expressing strong emotion in public, not cursing. To perform in a more ‘socially 
acceptable way’ Professionalism? Psa encourages free expression of emotion only in 
circumscribed circumstances. Anger in particular is an unacceptable emotion? 
